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The RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter was initiated as the Light
Helicopter Family (LHX) in 1982 when an Army Aviation Mission Area
Analysis (AAMAA) identified the need for an armed reconnaissance
aircraft. Eighteen years later, the program has yet to reach a Defense
Acquisition Board Milestone II review.
This thesis described the history of the RAH-66 Comanche
Helicopter acquisition program during these years. The research focused
on the question of what significant events and issues have occurred over
the course of the Comanche's development that have allowed it to remain
a viable program. The research draws several conclusions from the
analysis of the Comanche's history. Mainly, despite the significant
duration of the program, a valid need for an armed reconnaissance
platform still exists. Secondly, the innovative program management of
Comanche has maintained a positive reputation for the program.
Finally, the loss of Comanche at this point in time would severely impact
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Military acquisition is often characterized by the media and other
reporting agencies as inept, wasteful, and mired in oversight at every
level. [Ref. 1] [Ref. 2] [Ref. 3] This perception is legitimized by the failure
of a few highly-visible procurement attempts, such as the Army's SGT
York, Division Air Defense (DIVAD) weapon. [Ref. 4:p. 27] However, the
acquisition of modern weapon systems is both a highly complex and
resource-intensive affair. It is not uncommon for acquisition programs to
span several years and cost American taxpayers billions of dollars.
As an acquisition category (ACAT) ID program, the RAH-66
Comanche Helicopter is one of the largest Department of Defense
acquisition programs. Long heralded as the Army's top acquisition
priority, the Comanche Helicopter first began life as the Light Helicopter
Family (LHX) in 1982 when an Army Aviation Mission Area Analysis
(AAMAA) identified the need for an armed reconnaissance aircraft. [Ref.
5:p.l] Eighteen years later, the program has yet to reach a Defense
Acquisition Board Milestone II review. [Ref. 6:p. 1]
This thesis will attempt to document the past eighteen years of
program history and identify the significant issues, events, and actions
taken by Program Managers, the Army, and other Government agencies,
that allowed the program to maintain its status as the centerpiece of
Army Aviation modernization. The story of how Comanche was
conceived, structured, restructured, and managed during a period in
which not only the United States, but also the world, witnessed
enormous political and social changes, is of great importance to those
who would manage or oversee future defense programs. The need to
understand and appreciate the history of the program and the significant
events and decisions associated with its management, is critical for
government officials involved in the planning, budgeting, and reporting of
DoD programs.
Historian Wood Gray wrote that when studied, history leads to
understanding and wisdom. [Ref. 7:p. 1] People strain to place an event
or situation into a continuing process so as to develop some
understanding of where they have been and where it is they might be
going. When they can place events into a time perspective, they can then
begin to develop a perspective of what has happened in the past and how
it affected the future. In so doing, they learn from their experiences.
Dr. John Tosh believes that historians and their readers look for
two types of guidance from history: To discover lessons learned from
events that have occurred before; and to develop a picture of where they
as people, stand in time and what the future may hold for us. [Ref. 8:pp.
1-10] For our purposes, it is the former that applies to a study of the
Comanche's history. Collectively and individually, people strive to learn
from their past mistakes, as well as their successes. The ability to
accomplish this by looking back across many generations is what sets
people apart from other species and "enables him to better understand
the present, in order to prepare himself to face the problems of the
future." [Ref. 7:p. 6]
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question of this thesis is: What significant
events and issues have occurred over the course of the RAH-66
Comanche program that have allowed it to remain a viable program?
The subsidiary research questions are as follows:
1. What is the history of the RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter
Acquisition Program?
2. What was the Army's initial acquisition strategy for the
Comanche program and how has it evolved?
3. What innovative measures were taken by the Program
Manager in the development of the aircraft?
4. What lessons can be learned from studying the history and
development of the RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter program?
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The scope of this case study is limited to the period of the program
from the original Mission Area Analysis in 1981 through present day.
Utilizing this historical database, the study will analyze the significant
events affecting the program and the actions taken by the Comanche
Program Managers, as well as those of the Army and Congress, that
enabled the program to maintain its overall viability and longevity.
The methodology used in this thesis is a historical case analysis of
the RAH-66 Comanche program history. To conduct this case analysis
the author conducted personal and telephonic interviews with past and
present personnel from the Program Management Office (PMO) and the
Army's Comanche TRADOC Systems Management (TSM) Office. He also
conducted a site visit to the PMO and TSM facility to discuss past and
present program issues, and performed a literature search of available
program-related documents, books, magazine articles, and other library
information resources relating to the RAH-66 Comanche.
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter I. Introduction: Identifies the focus and purpose of the
thesis as well as the primary and subsidiary research questions.
Chapter II. Background of Army Aviation: Provides the reader
with a concise history of post-Korean War Army Aviation history and
doctrine, as well as the capabilities of the current fleet of reconnaissance
and attack helicopters in the Army inventory.
Chapter III. The Acquisition Process: Provides the reader with an
abridged explanation of the process by which DoD conducts its
acquisition business.
Chapter IV. History of the RAH-66 Comanche Program: Discusses
in chronological order the history of the Comanche program, highlighting
the significant issues and events.
Chapter V. Analysis of Program Issues and Events: Analyzes the
significant issues and events of the program history and the actions of
the key players involved.
Chapter VI. Conclusions and Recommendations: Summarizes the
findings of the research and answers the research questions.
E. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY
This thesis will document the history of the RAH-66 Comanche
acquisition program, and through historical analysis, describe the
significant events and issues responsible for its longevity and viability.
By understanding why certain events transpired, how they affected the
program, and the resultant actions taken on behalf of those events, DoD
officials can then begin learning from the past. As the noted philosopher
George Santayana proclaimed: [Ref. 7:p. 6]
When experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy
is perpetual. Those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it.
II. BACKGROUND
The helicopter is aerodynamically unsound. It is like lifting
oneself by one's boot-straps. It is no good as an air
vehicle... No matter what the Army says, I know that it does
not need any. Unnamed Air Force General, 1950 [Ref. 9:p. 1]
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter establishes the Comanche's place in the historical
context of Army Aviation, and provides the necessary information to
contrast the aircraft with the Army's current inventory of reconnaissance
and attack helicopters. The chapter provides the reader a brief history of
Army Aviation, from the separation of the Army Air Corps after World
War II, through the growth periods of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and
into the final decade of the Cold War, when the LHX concept was born.
Finally, the chapter will furnish a brief description of the Army's current
fleet of reconnaissance and attack helicopters.
B. ARMY AVIATION HISTORY
Despite what senior Air Force officers may have said regarding
helicopters, the last fifty years provide clear evidence of the tactical and
strategic value of this "aerodynamically unsound" air vehicle. Almost
immediately after its divorce from the Army, the Air Force began to see
its role in future conflicts as one of strategic aerial warfare. Even during
the final days of World War II (WWII), when it was still known as the
Army Air Corps, it seemed reluctant to provide the dedicated close-air
support required by soldiers on the ground. The Army had little choice
but to search for its own solution, which it found in the form of small
observation and cargo airplanes and helicopters. [Ref 9:p. 3]
1 . Establishing a "New" Army Air Corps
In the period immediately following WWII, the Army purchased its
first helicopters, fifty Bell Helicopter OH- 13 Sioux. Initially unsure of
how to employ the new aircraft, the Army would quickly realize the
tremendous potential of rotary-winged aircraft during the impending
Korean War. The obvious choice was to use them as aerial artillery
spotting platforms or resupply vehicles for units isolated in remote areas.
However, aerial medical evacuation of wounded soldiers became their
greatest contribution. By the end of the war, more than 21,000 wounded
servicemen were evacuated by the Army's rotary-wing workhorse, the H-
13 Sioux. [Ref 10:p. 87]
The Korean War had demonstrated the helicopter's unique ability
to neutralize the effects of mountainous and rugged terrain on the
soldier. The Army's use of small helicopters to hover up and down the
slopes of difficult terrain, and the Marines' limited use of their larger CH-
19 Chickasaw helicopters to transport small units into combat, gave rise
to a new and evolutionary concept known as airmobility. [Ref. 1 l:p. 5]
2. Airmobility Doctrine
As the Army began to develop this new doctrine, the theory known
as airmobility began to expand. Major General James M. Gavin, the G-3
at the Department of the Army, directed the development of tactical
doctrine for the combat employment of helicopters. [Ref. ll:p. 5] His
belief that warfare on a nuclear battlefield would require rapid movement
of troops and equipment placed special emphasis on the helicopter.
Specifically, Gavin believed that cavalry operations such as
reconnaissance, screening, exploitation, and pursuit, would be critical on
the future battlefield, and best performed by a combination of armed,
troop-carrying, and cargo helicopters. [Ref. 9:p. 6] His vision and
ingenuity would result in Field Manual (FM) 57-35, "Army Transport
Aviation-Combat Operations," which detailed the basic cavalry tactics
and techniques that would be proven in combat during the Vietnam War.
[Ref. ll:p. 5]
In April of 1962, the Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board,
popularly known as the Howze Board (named for the board's president,
General Hamilton H. Howze), recommended sweeping changes to current
Army force structure by converting five of its sixteen active divisions to
airmobile divisions. These new divisions would utilize organic helicopters
and fixed-wing aircraft in place of many surface vehicles. [Ref. 12:p. 1]
3. Vietnam: A Different Kind of War
The Vietnam War provided a real test for both the Army's new
airmobile doctrine and its reliance on the helicopter as a primary weapon
to defeat the enemy. The challenging terrain and lack of an established
road network fixed traditional armored units and legitimized airmobility.
[Ref. 9:p. 14] When asked how the war would have been waged without
helicopters, General William C. Westmoreland, Commander Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam responded: [Ref. 13:p. 10]
We would be fighting a different war, for a smaller area, at a
greater cost, with less effectiveness. We might as well have
asked, What would General Patton have done without his
tank?
Despite the eventual outcome of the war, it was a watershed event
for Army Aviation, as helicopters became an integral part of how the
Army would plan and conduct military operations over the next three
decades. However, in the 1970s, the concept of airmobility was not
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welcomed on the mechanized battlefields of Europe, which had become
"increasingly dominated by firepower." [Ref. 9:p. 33]
4. The Attack Helicopter Becomes King
The new voice of Army Aviation, Brigadier General William Maddox,
in his struggle to overcome what he saw as aviation's foremost challenge,
credibility with the mechanized army, chose the attack helicopter,
dedicated to the anti-tank mission, as Army Aviation's primary focus for
the future. [Ref. 9:p. 34] In 1972, the Joint Attack Helicopter
Instrumented Evaluation, known as the Ansbach Trials, was conducted
to determine the effectiveness of attack and observation helicopters in
the anti-tank role. AH-1 Cobras, armed with the new Tube-launched,
Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM)
and assisted by observation helicopters used as scouts, proved to be very
effective. [Ref. 9:pp. 24-25] The role of observation and attack
helicopters on the modern battlefield was now solidified.
During the 1980s, a change in the Army's doctrine from "Active
Defense" to "Airland Battle," provided Army Aviation the opportunity to
expand its limited, although important role. The Active Defense
philosophy of the previous decade focused on the effect of firepower and
the ability to destroy as many enemy tanks as possible. [Ref. 9:p. 22]
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Airland Battle stressed the importance of maneuver warfare, placing the
right amount of firepower at the appropriate time and in the most critical
location. Because of the helicopter's inherent mobility, this new doctrine
greatly benefited Army Aviation's struggle to remain relevant.
Today, attack helicopters remain the centerpiece of the branch.
Their role as a maneuver force similar to the air assault and air cavalry
forces of the Vietnam era has gained them new respect and acceptance in
modern U.S. military doctrine. [Ref. 9:p. 57]
C. CURRENT HELICOPTER INVENTORY
The current fleet of reconnaissance and attack helicopters is a
mixture of old and new technologies that illustrate a distinct contrast in
capabilities. The OH-58 remains relatively unchanged from its Vietnam
War heritage, while the OH-58D and AH-64 represent the latest in
rotorcraft technology. The AH-1 and OH/AH-6 have both been
extensively modified over the last 30 years through the use of technology
insertion. Nevertheless, they have nearly reached the limits of simple
modernization without significant airframe modifications such as was
done with the OH-58D. [Ref. 14]
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1. OH/AH-6 Cayuse
The Hughes Tool Company OH-6 Cayuse and Bell Helicopter OH-
58 Kiowa were both direct results of studies conducted during the 1950's
to determine light helicopters requirements. The Continental Army
Command (CONARC) stated the need for an inexpensive reconnaissance
helicopter to replace its aging fleet of H-13 and H-23 aircraft. [Ref. 15:p.
1] The aircraft requirements included: Simple to use, easy to maintain
and camouflage, operable from unprepared airfields in forward areas,
and single-pilot operable at low altitudes with an observer or passenger.
[Ref. 16:p. 206]. These aircraft are significant because they were the first
aircraft purchased directly by the Army. Prior to this, the Air Force or
Navy were responsible for procuring all Army aircraft.
Today, only a handfull of specially-modified OH-6 aircraft remain
in Army Special Operations units, although they bear only a superficial
resemblance to the original aircraft. Two variants are known to exist, the
AH-6J attack helicopter (see Figure 1) and the MH-6J insertion and
extraction transport. They posses a fully-articulating five-blade main
rotor and four-blade tail rotor, which combine to significantly reduce
external noise and, depending on configuration, allow for a top speed of
130 - 150 knots. Armament choices range from the M134 7.62 mini-gun
13
and BEI Hydra 70mm rocket pods, to the Stinger missile. Cockpits are
equipped with state-of-the-art multifunctional displays, a complete
navigation package, and Forward-Looking Infrared (FUR). [Ref. 17]
Figure 1. MD AH-6J Cayuse [Ref. 17]
2. OH-58 A/C Kiowa
Originally a losing participant in the Light Observation Helicopter
(LOH) competition of 1965, the Bell helicopter OH-58 (see Figure 2) won
a new lease on life when Hughes drastically raised the price of its OH-6
during contract negotiations for subsequent procurements. This forced
the Army to reopen a new competitive bid process for a light helicopter.








Figure 2. Bell OH-58 A/C Kiowa [Ref. 18]
The original aircraft, nicknamed "Kiowa," was first delivered to the
US Army on May 23, 1969. Later that year, the Army began fielding the
Kiowa to units in Vietnam. Little has changed with the aircraft over the
past three decades. The design includes an unsophisticated two-blade,
semi-rigid, seesaw-type main rotor, one Allison turboshaft turbine
engine, modest avionics, and room for two crewmembers and two
passengers. Later versions of the aircraft included an upgraded engine,
tail rotor, and avionics. Its top speed is around 120 knots. While
provisions for light weapons systems were available, the Army did not
routinely operate the aircraft in those configurations. [Ref. 18]
3. AH 1 Cobra
One result of the 1962 Howze Board was the recognition that the
Army's new airmobile concept would require the fire power of armed
helicopters to serve both as escorts for observation helicopters and troop-
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laden utility aircraft and as mobile artillery. [Ref. ll:pp. 22-23] Initial
attempts at arming utility aircraft already in the Army's inventory, such
as the venerable UH-1 Huey, were only moderately successful. Weighed
down with weapons and ammunition, the armed UH-1B (and later UH-
1M) struggled to keep up with the much faster troop-carrying Hueys. It
was clear that a new armed aerial platform, designed exclusively as an
attack aircraft, was required. Thus was born the requirement for the
Army's first dedicated attack helicopter. [Ref. 10:p. 114-115]
The AH-1 Cobra (see Figure 3) was unique in that it shared many
of its major components, including the engine and all of its drivetrain,
with the Army's workhorse, the UH-1. [Ref. 10:p. 120] The cockpit was
designed with tandem seating, which featured the pilot sitting behind
and slightly above the copilot/ gunner. Stub wings were mounted on
each side of the fuselage, providing hardpoints for storage of weapons
such as 2.75-inch Folding Fin Aerial Rockets (FFAR). The nose of the
aircraft housed a slewable turret with a 7.62mm machine gun and a
40mm grenade launcher. Top speed exceeded 120 knots. [Ref. 19]
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Figure 3. Bell AH- IF Cobra [Ref. 19]
4. OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
In 1981, Bell Helicopter received a contract, through the Army
Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP), to modify the Vietnam-era fleet
of OH-58 A/C aircraft with advanced optics and sensors. [Ref. 20:p. 203]
The result was the OH-58D Kiowa AHIP. While bearing some
resemblance to its older sibling, the new Kiowa became a truly modern
helicopter. Improvements included replacing the antiquated seesaw type
main rotor with a four-blade composite rotor system and a new, more
powerful engine. These changes significantly increased aircraft
performance. The most noticeable change, however, was the addition of
a mast-mounted sight housing a thermal-imaging system, low-light
television, and a laser range finder/ designator. [Ref. 21] While the older
aircraft relied on its pilot's unaided eye to locate the enemy, the OH-58D
Kiowa was now assisted by high-powered optics.
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In September 1987, fifteen specially modified OH-58D's
participated in Operation Prime Chance, a military action in the Persian
Gulf against Iranian high-speed gunboats. These aircraft, known as
Prime Chance variants, were rapidly armed with a combination of Stinger
air-to-air missiles, Hellfire anti-tank missiles, a 0.50 caliber machine
gun, and seven tube 2.75-inch FFAR pods. Their success led to the
Army's current variant, the OH-58D (I) Kiowa Warrior (see Figure 4). [Ref.
21]
Figure 4. Bell OH-58D Kiowa Warrior [Ref.. 21]
The success of the aircraft also led to a change in its combat role.
Initially intended for unarmed reconnaissance and target designation,
the Kiowa Warrior now fills the armed reconnaissance role in air cavalry
units, and the attack helicopter role in the Army's light divisions. In
both cases, it replaces the Vietnam era combination of OH-58A/C and
18
AH- IF helicopters. The original AHIPs began retrofit and remanufacture
into the armed version in fiscal year (FY) 1993. [Ref. 20:p. 203]
5. AH-64 Apache
The AH-64 Apache (see Figure 5) is the Army's most advanced
attack helicopter, capable of carrying up to sixteen Hellfire missiles or a
combination of missiles and the 2.75-inch FFAR. Additionally, the
Apache carries a 30mm cannon in a turret under the fuselage. [Ref.
22:pp. Al - A4]
-v -'Um;- ~c.'.. -^"
Figure 5. Boeing AH-64A Apache [Ref. 23]
Prior to the advent of the Apache, attack battalions were equipped
with the OH-58A/C Kiowa and the AH-1 Cobra Helicopters. These two
aircraft complemented each other well, working together as
scout/weapons teams to conduct attack operation. When the Apache
was fielded, it was intended to replace the Cobra and continue working
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with the Kiowa as a scout/weapons team. It was quickly realized,
however, that the capabilities of the Apache far exceeded those of the
Cobra, and that the Kiowa's deficiencies in terms of speed and optics,
only served to degrade the effectiveness of the Apache. [Ref. 24]
The Apache still needed a scout helicopter; however, it was clear
the Kiowa was not the answer. The Army's ultimate solution was to be
the Comanche. Unfortunately, that result was still several years from
being realized. The interim solution was to allow the Apache to perform
both the scout and gunship roles. [Ref. 24]
D. THE RAH-66 COMANCHE
The RAH-66 Comanche (see Figure 6) is the Army's planned
replacement aircraft for the OH-58, OH-6, OH-58D, and AH-1
helicopters. Comanche will be incorporated into the air cavalry and
reconnaissance units of every division and corps, and into the heavy
division and corps attack helicopter battalions, as the scout for the AH-
64 Apache helicopter. It will also fill the Army's attack helicopter role in
the light divisions. [Ref. 25]
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Figure 6. Boeing Sikorsky RA.H-66 Comanche [Ref. 26]
The Comanche provides a dramatic increase in combat
effectiveness and survivability by addressing the major deficiencies in the
Army's current fleet of light helicopters. Those deficiencies include:
Tactical and operational obsolescence, marginal night and adverse
weather capabilities, high operating costs, and poor survivability,
reliability, and performance. [Ref. 27:p. 4]
General requirements for the reconnaissance variant of the
Comanche have remained stable despite the lengthy development
process. The Army plans for the Comanche to be a lightweight, low-cost,
advanced technology helicopter with the primary mission of performing
armed reconnaissance, while possessing an embedded air combat
capability. [Ref. 27:p. 4] Comanche is a two-seat, twin-engine aircraft
capable of performing reconnaissance and attack missions both day and
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night, and under conditions of reduced visibility, low ceilings, smoke,
dust, and snow. [Ref. 28]
Figure 7. Boeing Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche [Ref. 29]
The aircraft is unique in that its construction centers around an
all-composite airframe (see Figure 7), enabling the Comanche to achieve
a radar cross section 630 times smaller than that of the AH-64 Apache
and 250 times less than the current, and much smaller, armed
reconnaissance helicopter, the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. This capability is
achieved through the use of composites and other measures, such as
retractable landing gear, flat and canted body sides, an enclosed tailrotor
called the fantail, and internal weapons storage bays. [Ref. 30 :p. 35] To
reduce the infrared signature of the aircraft, an innovative exhaust
system was designed to run internally down the length of the tail boom
so that cool ambient air can mix with the exhaust before it is vented
beneath the aircraft on either side of the tail. [Ref. 32:pp. 22-23]
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The Comanche will be equipped with a suite of passive sensors
which include: Long-range, second-generation FLIR, a television targeting
sensor, and an upgraded, miniaturized fire control radar similar to the
Longbow Apache radar. [Ref. 31] With the computing power equivalent
to four supercomputers, the Comanche's onboard systems will provide
sensor data fusion and high-speed analysis and correlation. Battlefield
information is displayed to the crew via multifunctional displays.
Communications and data transmission will be conducted with state-of-
the-art dual anti-jam VHF-FM and UHF-AM "Have Quick" tactical radios.
[Ref. 26] The program is attempting to achieve significant cost savings
through maximum commonality with the Air Force's F-22 Raptor
avionics program. [Ref. 26]
The Army's original intent was to build an integrated armed
reconnaissance helicopter, an idea that was and still is considered
unique. As such, the Comanche is equipped with the ability to carry a
combination of missiles, rockets, and bullets. Mounted in a turret below
the aircraft is a General Dynamics three-barrel, 20mm cannon with a
500 round capacity. Within its internal, side-opening weapons bays,
Comanche can carry up to six Hellfire missiles, 12 Stinger missiles, or 24
Hydra 2.75-inch FFAR. Optional stub wings can be mounted on the
aircraft to increase the weapons load or carry auxiliary fuel tanks for
23
self-deployment. [Ref. 26] In all, the Comanche can go to war with up to
56 unguided 2.75" FFAR, 28 Stinger air-to-air missiles, or 14 Hellfire
anti-tank missiles. [Ref. 32:p. 23]
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the history, doctrine, and equipment of
modern Army aviation, beginning with the use of light observation fixed
and rotary-wing aircraft during the Korean War. As the helicopter
matured in terms of capability and technology, the Army developed
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) that capitalized on the
strengths of the aircraft. Today, the helicopter is an integral component
of the Army's combined arms team.
The RAH-66 Comanche is expected to replace four aircraft
currently in the Army inventory. With its advanced sensors and optics,
combined with survivability and maneuverability not seen before in a
helicopter, the Army believes the Comanche will fill a long-standing
deficiency in the area of long-range, real-time reconnaissance.
Currently, the program is in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction
(PDRR) phase of the acquisition cycle. It is scheduled to undergo a MS II
DAB review in April, 2000. The current Comanche schedule plans for an
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2007.
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III. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will describe the acquisition process currently used
by the Department of Defense (DoD). This description is necessary to
understand the management of the Comanche program. The chapter
will to explain the acquisition process as it existed in 1982, when
Concept Exploration (CE) was initiated with a Preliminary Design (PD)
study. [Ref. 28] In order to maintain consistency throughout the thesis,
however, current (1999) terminology is utilized. Figure 1 cross-
references the old and new terms for each phase and milestone.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Throughout the 1950s, fears of nuclear war fueled the DoD
procurement process, fostering one that ensured superiority by focusing
on performance at the expense of cost and schedule. A 1962 study of
twelve major defense projects by the Harvard Weapons Acquisition
Research Project, determined that, on average, project costs were seven
times higher than initially estimated and that development lasted 36%
longer than originally scheduled. [Ref. 33: p. 3] The findings and the
eventual recommendations of the Harvard Project resulted in a renewed
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interest by Congressional and DoD leadership in the acquisition process
itself. Over the course of the next several decades, several Executive and
Legislative Branch initiatives to improve the acquisition process were
undertaken.
In 1985, President Reagan's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management issued a report that established the basis for the current
acquisition process. The report was the result of an investigation by an
Acquisition Task Force (ATF) headed by Dr. William J. Perry, who would
later become Secretary of Defense. The ATF compared government and
commercial acquisition systems to find examples of successful
acquisition processes that could be used to structure DoD reforms. The
result was a group of initiatives that continue to refine and improve the
acquisition process by emphasizing commercial practices, while
attempting to reduce excessive oversight and regulation. [Ref. 34:pp. 48-
62]
C. THE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS
OMB Circular A- 109, Major Systems Acquisitions , which provides
acquisition policy for all executive branch agencies, defines the
acquisition process as: [Ref. 35:p. 3]
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.... the sequence of acquisition activities starting from the
agency's reconciliation of its mission needs, with its
capabilities, priorities and resources, and extending through
the introduction of a system into operational use or the
otherwise successful achievement of program objectives.
Table 1: Acquisition Terminology






















Source: Developed by author
While OMB's statement is somewhat general, it does infer a
process with a definitive beginning: the mission need assessment, and a
conclusion: successful achievement of program objectives. DoD
Regulation 5000. 2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense
Acquisition Programs and Major Automated Information Systems ,
establishes a model for managing Major Defense Acquisition Programs
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(MDAPs). The model is a process of logical phases, separated by
milestones (refer to Table 1). Because of the inherent differences in every
acquisition program, the model is tailorable to address the conditions of
any particular program. The Program Manager (PM) and Milestone
Decision Authority (MDA) will ensure the program process flows logically
throughout a prescribed set of phases "designed to reduce risk, ensure
affordability, and provide adequate information." [Ref. 36:p. 1-1]
1. Mission Needs
Before a service can begin a new acquisition program, it must first
identify, document, and validate a mission need through a Mission Area
Analysis (MAA). [Ref. 36:p. 1-3] The MAA reconciles the need with the
service's overall capabilities, priorities, and resources. If analysis
confirms the requirement for a new capability, it is not expressed in
equipment terms, but rather in terms of the mission, purpose, capability,
schedule and cost objectives, and operating constraints. [Ref. 35:p. 7]
Services shall first attempt to satisfy the new mission need by a non-
material solution, such as changing tactics, doctrine, or organizational
structure. [Ref. 36:p. 1-3]
If a non-material solution is deemed not feasible, a material
solution is pursued. The deficiency, described in broad terms, is
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translated into a new document, the Mission Need Statement (MNS). [Ref.
37] The MNS explains the results of the MAA and why a non-material
solution does not adequately correct the deficiency. It does not address
specific performance characteristics or solutions. [Ref. 38:p. 40]
DoD has established categories for acquisition programs to
determine the appropriate level of oversight. These acquisition categories
(ACAT) range from I to III (with subcategories at level I), and are based on
the size and complexity of the program. ACAT I programs such as
Comanche, constitute the largest, most costly programs. [Ref. 31:p. 1-2]
Once the requirement for a material solution is validated,
requirements developers must consider the most cost-effective solution.
Most often, modification of systems already in the Government inventory
is significantly more cost-effective than the purchase of new equipment
and should be considered first. If modification is not feasible or does not
satisfy the requirement, a new acquisition program may be justified.
DoD5000. 1, Defense Acquisition , lists a hierarchy of material alternatives
that must by observed by requirements developers. [Ref. 39:p. 1-6]
After determination of a material alternative requirement, the final
MNS is presented to a requirements validation authority for review,
validation, and approval. For the largest programs, the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is the validation and approval
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authority for MNSs. For smaller programs, the chiefs of the military
services, heads of defense agencies, and Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs)
of unified commands validate and approve MNSs. Successful passage
through the requirements and validation authority confirms the service's
need does exist and that it cannot be met by a non-material solution. It
ensures the validation process is complete and the need is valid.
Additionally, it will review the document to determine joint service
potential. The approved MNS is sent to the MDA for a Milestone (MS)
decision. [Ref. 38:pp. 40-42]
2. Milestone 0, Concept Studies Approval
The objective of MS is to determine if the mission need warrants
initiation of a concept study. A favorable decision by the MDA authorizes
entry into Phase 0, Concept Exploration (CE), but does not constitute
program initiation. [Ref. 36:p. 1-6] The MDA will identify the lead
organization(s) for the study, the dollar amount, and the source of
funding for the study. Finally, a minimum set of alternatives to be
examined and the exit criteria for MS I are established. [Ref. 38:p. 47]
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3. Phase 0, Concept Exploration
Generally, Phase consists of several competitive, parallel, short-
term concept studies. [Ref. 38:p. 48] The focus of these studies is to
explore various material alternatives and determine the most promising
system concepts. Typically, high-risk areas are identified for the most
promising system concepts, along with proposed acquisition strategies,
initial cost, schedule and performance objectives, software requirements,
tradeoffs, and test and evaluation strategies. [Ref. 36:p. 1-4] Finally,
prior to the MS I Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) (advisors to the
USD(AT&L)) review, a PM is appointed. [Ref. 40:pp. 1-4-1-6]
4. Milestone I, Approval to begin a New Program
MS I marks a critical step, as a favorable decision indicates
approval for a new acquisition program and entry into Phase I, Program
Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR). [Ref. 38:p. 48] The objectives of
MS I include reviewing the results of Phase and determining if the
achieved results warrant program initiation. If so, the PM proposes an
acquisition strategy to guide the execution of the program from initiation
through post-production support. [Ref. 36: pp.3-3 - 3-4] The acquisition
strategy will address methods for attaining the proposed system in the
most cost effective manner, by setting aggressive yet achievable cost
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objectives, and if necessary conducting tradeoffs between performance
and schedule to achieve a balanced set of goals. [Ref. 39 :p. 5] Together
with the using community, the PM also develops the Acquisition Program
Baseline (APB) to document the most important cost, schedule, and
performance objectives and thresholds as outlined and described in the
Operational Requirements Document (ORD).
5. Phase I, Program Definition and Risk Reduction
Phase I of the acquisition process is characterized by assessment
of one or more concept and design approach. A thorough analysis of the
advantages and disadvantages of alternative concepts is conducted, to
include supportability and manufacturing process design considerations.
The ultimate goal of PDRR is to reduce the risk of manufacturing the
system, incorporating new and emerging technologies, and supporting
the final product. This is accomplished through prototyping,
developmental testing, and early operational testing of critical systems,
subsystems, and components. Additionally, cost-driver identification,
life-cycle estimates, cost-performance tradeoffs, and other analysis are
conducted as part of an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) and as a means to
reduce risk, increase operational capability, and establish or update cost
objectives. [Ref. 41]
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6. Milestone II, Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Approval
As with MS I, this milestone seeks to determine if the performance
of the proposed program during Phase I, warrants continuation and
entry into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
phase. [Ref. 36:p. 1-6] The MDA focuses on program affordability, the
national military strategy, and long-range investment and modernization
plans to rigorously assess program continuation potential. Because of
the significant resource commitment associated with EMD, an in-depth
analysis of the identified program risks, as well as the proposed risk
management plan is critical. [Ref. 41]
As during MS I, the acquisition strategy is updated and modified
as necessary, and approved by the MDA. Additionally, a Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) Strategy is considered at this time. LRIP involves the
production of a limited number of production-configured systems for use
in operational tests and confirmation of initial production base
capability, as well as the capability for an orderly increase to full rate
production. For ACAT I programs, the authority to proceed with LRIP
normally requires a separate program review by the MDA, however, this
decision will be made as part of the EMD approval. [Ref. 36:p. 1-4] [Ref.
41]
7. Phase II, Engineering and Manufacturing Development
The primary focus of EMD is to choose the most promising system
design and make certain that at the end of EMD, it is a "stable,
interoperable, producible, supportable, and cost-effective design." [Ref.
36:p. 1-4] This is accomplished by validating manufacturing and
production capabilities and processes, and ensuring the system meets
specifications through Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E), and
is operationally effective and suitable through Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E). LRIP can begin once all processes are confirmed.
[Ref. 38:p. 49]
8. Milestone III, Production Approval
A favorable MS III decision authorizes entrance into production for
an ACAT I program and a commitment to manufacture, and deploy the
new system. Once again, revised APBs and acquisition strategies are
approved. [Ref. 38:p. 49] The MDA ensures the system is prepared for
production and establishes with the PM, a realistic production APB. The
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decision to proceed with full-rate production cannot be finalized until the
official test reporting to Congress, is completed. [Ref. 36:p. 1-7]
9. Phase III, Production, Fielding/ Deployment, and
Operational Support
Formally known as Full Rate Production and Deployment, this
phase indicates the system has now entered production, and that
delivery to the field, along with the proper support infrastructure, is
occurring. The Program Office continues to monitor system status to
ensure it continues to meet the user's requirements. Any deficiencies
discovered during DT&E and OT&E are resolved during this phase.
Follow-on OT&E (FOT&E) may occur in this phase to continue assessing
interoperability, quality, and performance. Additionally, as the system
ages or technology enhancements occur, the potential for modification
exists. Management of these modifications will continue during this
phase. [Ref. 36:p. 1-7]
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter discussed the process used by acquisition
professionals within the DoD to develop, manage, and ultimately field a
major weapon system. It is a flexible process designed to allow the PM to
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manage a program utilizing the best commercial and military practices
available. The next chapter will detail the history of the RAH-66
Comanche acquisition program.
36
IV. HISTORY OF THE RAH-66 COMANCHE PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
As the 1980s dawned, Army Aviation was experiencing a newfound
significance in the Army's emerging Airland Battle Doctrine.
Emphasizing combat in depth, mobility, agility, and maneuver, Airland
Battle appeared to be tailor-made for helicopters, at least in the eyes of
Aviation's senior leaders. [Ref. 9:pp. 35-37] Fielding of the Army's two
newest helicopters, the UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache, was well
under way, and plans for the next generation helicopter were beginning
to gather momentum. This chapter will discuss the history of the RAH-
66 Comanche program, from its genesis as the Light Helicopter Family
(LHX) to the present, the eve of its most recently scheduled MS II DAB
Review.
B. REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION
The driving force behind many of the early program decisions lay
within the program's Cold War heritage. Concept formulation began with
preliminary study efforts undertaken in 1981. Completed in 1982, the
Army Aviation Mission Area Analysis (AAMAA) was a comprehensive
analysis of the abilities of a mid-1980s friendly force using tactics
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commensurate with Airland Battle doctrine, against a projected mid-
1990s Warsaw Pact threat in a European scenario. The primary purpose
of the analysis was to determine deficiencies in aviation missions,
doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. Over 77 major
deficiencies and 260 shortfalls were identified with the Army's current
light fleet, which at the time constituted 80% of Army helicopters. [Ref.
5:p.2] Major deficiencies included: [Ref. 42]
D Tactically and technically obsolete 30 year old aircraft
Little or no night and adverse weather capability
Marginally supportable
Little or no payload
D No air-to-air capability
No self-deployment capability
Not survivable on the future battlefield
In March 1982, senior Army leadership endorsed the AAMAA
during an Army Aviation Systems Program Review (AASPR). The review
determined that current doctrine was sound, considering the postulated
threat of the mid-1990s. Keeping with standard acquisition procedures,
deficiencies were examined for possible correction through the least
costly, yet effective method. Remaining uncorrected deficiencies were
determined to require a material solution. The LHX emerged as the most
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viable concept to meet future Army Aviation capability, modernization,
and survivability requirements. [Ref. 43 :p. 1]
The AAMAA recommended the development of a follow-on scout,
attack, and utility aircraft to replace prior to 1995, the OH-58 Kiowa,
OH-6 Cayuse, AH-1 Cobra, and UH-1 Iroquois. The recommendation
contained plans for a family of aircraft including two variants, an armed
scout/ reconnaissance and attack (SCAT) version and a
utility/observation version. Together these aircraft would complement
the Army's newer helicopters, the Army Helicopter Improvement Program
(AHIP, now the OH-58D), the UH-60 Black Hawk, and the AH-64 Apache.
(Reames p. 2) The AAMAA plan required LHX to possess extensive
commonality throughout both variants, with common dynamic
components, core mission equipment, and subsystems. [Ref. 42:p. 1]
In January 1983, a LHX Special Workgroup was formed to provide
a framework for the LHX program. The group consisted of members from
six Army organizations, including the Aviation Research and
Development Command, Army Aviation Center, Missile Command,
Armaments Command, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and
Army Material Command (AMC). The group identified numerous generic
technology programs as critical to supporting the LHX development.
After only a short time, the group submitted the Justification for a Major
System New Start (JMSNS) to the Department of the Army for approval
and inclusion in the Army's Fiscal Year (FY) 1985 Program Objective
Memorandum (POM). The JMSNS and its subsequent approval by the
Army, justified the need to develop a family of light, fast, highly-
maneuverable, vertical lift aircraft capable of operations in the Airland
Battle environment of the future. On December 29, 1983, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense endorsed the LHX program through approval of a
Program Budget Decision (PBD); as a result, the Aviation Research and
Development Command in St. Louis formed a provisional Project Office.
[Ref. 43:p.l-3]
C. CONCEPT EXPLORATION
The Concept Exploration (CE) Phase was officially initiated with
Preliminary Design (PD) study efforts in 1983. [Ref. 28] TRADOC issued
a study directive in December, outlining a Concept Formulation Package
(CFP) for the LHX. The early efforts of program officials and prospective
contractors were considered essential in establishing operational




Fixed-price PD contracts valued at $942,500 were awarded 15
September, 1983, by the Applied Technology Laboratory at Ft. Eustis,
Virginia, to Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Boeing-Vertol (now Boeing
Helicopter), Hughes Helicopter (later McDonnell Douglas, now Boeing
Helicopter), and Sikorsky Aircraft. [Ref. 42 :p. 2] Each company studied
potential concepts and designs of derivative helicopters, advanced
technology conventional helicopters, and several other advanced
configuration aircraft. The contractors completed and submitted their
Best Technical Approach (BTA) as a part of these contracts. [Ref. 28]
On December 21, 1983, the Applied Technology Laboratory
awarded competitive Advanced Rotorcraft Technology Integration (ARTI)
contracts to the four PD contractors and to International Business
Machines (IBM). The ARTI studies were initiated to develop a series of
designs for an advanced integrated and automated cockpit as well as
full-mission, single-pilot SCAT simulation. [Ref. 42:p. 2] The ARTI effort
was part of an intensive technology risk-reduction program initiated by
the program office. The intent was to determine if the technology
necessary for single-pilot aircraft operation in a reconnaissance and
attack mission profile existed. The result was a determination that, in
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several situations, the workload inside the aircraft required one pilot to
operate the aircraft and another to coordinate operations. To reduce the
risk associated with single-pilot operations and because the probability
of mission accomplishment in a dual station aircraft was higher, the
Army made the decision to develop a two-pilot aircraft that would be
single-pilot operable. [Ref. 5:p. 4]
ARTI contracts were expanded in 1985, to include PD of both
electro-optical (EO) systems and very high-speed integrated circuit
(VHSIC) electronics. [Ref. 42:p.2] Risk reduction contracts awarded later
that year to the joint venture of Boeing Helicopters and Sikorsky Aircraft,
and to the McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company and Bell Helicopter
Textron Inc., focused on the high-risk areas such as design and testing
of the aircraft's advanced avionics, dubbed the Mission Equipment
Package (MEP), airframe wind tunnel testing, and engineering
simulations. [Ref. 28]
The purpose of the contracts was to allow the contractors to
develop and demonstrate, through "bread-board" and "brass-board"
demonstrations, critical technology areas such as the VHSIC mission
computer, electro-optical target acquisition sensors (EOTAS), pilotage
system, and Helmet-Mounted-Display (HMD) subsystems. [Ref. 42:pp. 2-
3] In addition to these Government-mandated areas, each team pursued
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additional risk-reduction efforts based on its own assessments and as
part of the program office's overall risk-reduction program. [Ref. 28]
2. Trade Off Analysis
The Trade Off Analysis (TOA) was a detailed analysis of potential
design concepts and potential alternative systems capable of fulfilling the
Army's requirements. A total of five separate alternatives were
considered. The TOA also addressed design characteristics such as:
Aircraft configuration, one versus two operators, survivability, reliability
and maintainability (RAM), and schedule, risk, and cost factors. The
TOA was completed in 1985 with findings for both the SCAT and utility
variants that included: Twin-engines, high-speed helicopter or tiltrotor
aircraft, capable of day, night, and adverse weather operations from a
fully automatic, two-crewmember cockpit. Advanced features such as
fully integrated EOTAS, passive and active survivability features, and
joint service capable communications and navigation equipment were
also included. Armament for the SCAT aircraft included the newly
developed Radio Frequency (RF) fire-and-forget anti-tank missile. Both
variants would receive Stinger air-to-air missiles and a turret-mounted
cannon of at least 20mm bore. The TOA was instrumental in the design
of the LHX during the early phases of the program. [Ref. 5:p.3-4]
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3. Formation of the Program Office
The LHX program was initially managed by a small number of
individuals assigned to the U.S. Army Aviation Research and
Development Command in St. Louis, Missouri; however, in December,
1983, a provisional program office was formed. As a result of the merger
between the Aviation Research and Development Command and the
aviation portion of the Troop Support and Aviation Material Readiness
Command, the LHX program office was subsequently assigned to the
Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) in 1984. On January 16th 1984,
the first LHX Program Manager (PM) was assigned and on October 31 st
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the Program Management Office (PMO) was officially established. A FY85
manpower authorization voucher authorized seven military and forty-
seven civilian technical and management positions. [Ref. 43 :p. 3-4]
The first PM, a Colonel with a Bachelor of Science degree in
Industrial Engineering and a Master of Science in Mechanical
Engineering, did not have an extensive background in the acquisition
field. His previous experience included only three-and-a-half years at
Department of the Army Headquarters monitoring weapon systems
development. Due to the significant visibility of the program, he would
maintain the title of PM for only a short period. However, his legacy
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would be the LHX's baseline acquisition strategy, which would guide the
program for many years to come. [Ref. 43 :p. 3]
In August, 1984, the Under Secretary of the Army and the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army appointed a new PM, Brigadier General (BG)
Ronald K. Andreson. The move was made in part due to the high-
visibility and importance of the LHX program; however, Andreson 's
background also made the decision appropriate. He had a Bachelor of
Science Degree in Engineering and Masters in Aerospace Engineering.
The general's previous experience included serving as the PM for one of
the Army's newest helicopters, the UH-60 Black Hawk. His most recent
assignment was serving as AVSCOM's Deputy Commander for Research
and Development.
BG Andreson's charter as PM, approved March 28, 1985, gave him
significant autonomy. In particular, it stated that the PM reported
directly to the Commanding General of AVSCOM, and that he had the
full line authority of the Commanding General of the Army Materiel
Command. According to Andreson, this level of independence did not
exist when he was the PM for the Black Hawk. [Ref. 43:pp. 3-4] This
autonomy would have a direct impact on the innovative management
approach that BG Andreson and subsequent PMs would take with
Comanche, and will be discussed in more detail in chapter V.
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4. Baseline Strategy Formulation
As industry wrestled with the LHX concepts, the Aviation Systems
Command (AVSCOM), began assessing potential acquisition strategies. A
trade-offs determination (TOD) board conducted in 1983 also explored
several strategies. [Ref. 43:p. 6] The goal was to develop a strategy that
could satisfy LHX requirements within an acceptable degree of risk.
Several low-risk strategies were analyzed, including both an EMD fly-off
of SCAT aircraft with a FY92 production goal, and a completely hands-off
approach by the Government. The eventual baseline acquisition
strategy, however, was deemed lowest risk.
Acquisition plan number one, approved on August 12, 1984,
established the LHX baseline acquisition strategy. This approach called
for the LHX to enter production no later than FY90. [Ref. 44:p.3] To meet
this ambitious timeline, the previously mentioned joint ventures were
scheduled to begin the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) (formally Full-Scale Development) phase in FY86, following a
combined MS I/MS II (formally Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council - DSARC) decision in October of 1985. The air vehicle fly-off was
scheduled for FY89, with the winner entering production shortly
thereafter. Program goals included: [Ref. 44:p.3]
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D 7500-8500 lbs. primary mission gross weight for SCAT.
$5 million average unit flyaway costs in FY84 dollars.
70% commonality between SCAT and utility aircraft versions.
D 50% reduction over the AH-l/UH-1 in average maintenance
man-hour per flight hour.
D 25% improvement in fuel economy over AH-l/UH-1 T-53 series
engine.
This baseline strategy provided a foundation upon which
subsequent strategies would build as circumstances evolved.
5. A Fluid Acquisition Strategy
Almost immediately after publication, the LHX baseline acquisition
plan came under fire. Specifically, the Army's attempt to field LHX in the
first years of the next decade required rapid acceleration of the
acquisition process. Because of that, the program would not undergo a
discrete MS I decision; instead, it combined the CE and PDRR phases,
and planned for a joint MS 1/ II decision to enter EMD. Upon further
review of the proposed strategy, the DoD Inspector General believed the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was misled and in fact believed
the program, as briefed to OSD, did in fact contain two discrete MS
decision points. The Army maintained that OSD endorsed the
combination strategy by approval of the service's FY85 POM. Despite the
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eventual outcome supporting the Army's position, the confusion was
indicative of the early schedule problems the program would face. [Ref.
43:pp.l4-15]
Over the next three years, the LHX acquisition strategy would
undergo several adjustments in an attempt to further reduce program
risk, and manage increasingly constrained budgets. In 1985, several
risk-reduction contracts were cancelled due to funding constraints. In
an effort to reduce the technical risk associated with the loss of those
contracts, the PM revised the baseline strategy. The basic competitive
contractor teaming strategy remained. However, EMD was stretched out
to 60 months; and production was scheduled for FY92. The additional
time allowed for expanded contractor risk-reduction efforts in the areas
of concept formulation, one-pilot cockpit proof-of-concept, and
preliminary system design. [Ref. 44:p. 4]
By July, 1986, the second acquisition strategy was deemed
unaffordable. Despite a Defense Science Board recommendation to
maintain competition throughout EMD, the PM was forced to adjust the
program to remain within POM funding guidance. The revised strategy
split EMD into two phases. Phase I, entitled Detailed Design, called for
competition between contractor teams, through the use of Firm Fixed
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Price (FFP) contracts. At the end of Phase I, the program would down-
select to one team and continue developmental efforts. [Ref. 44:p. 6-7]
By 1987, the LHX acquisition strategy, an ever-developing
document, only vaguely resembled its 1984 progenitor. Concerned with
system maturity and overall costs, OSD officials continued to object to
the program decision to conduct a joint MS I / II decision. As such, the
newest acquisition strategy acknowledged concern over the compressed
time-frame by transitioning CE into a fifty-six month PDRR phase
beginning in FY88. The intent for a now discrete PDRR was to allow the
program more time to reduce cost, schedule, technical, and performance
risk. PDRR requirements included: [Ref. 42: p. 3]
Contractor teaming, with competition between teams.
Three dual-station prototypes per team, each with single-pilot
capability
D Core MEP on flight prototypes
D Full MEP on a ground-based avionics prototype
Integrated training system
D Contractor and Government developmental testing
EMD, scheduled for 26 months, would begin after a successful MS
II decision and down-selection to one contracting team. A fixed-price
contract award was planned for September 1992, and Low-Rate Initial
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Production (LRIP) contract award for November 1994. A separate EMD
for the assault variant was scheduled to begin in December 1995 and
last for 35 months. The 1987 program strategy allowed for fixed price
competitive development and production contracts. PD contractors
joined together to create two competing teams, each with a single design
that both members of the team could eventually produce individually.
This approach would allow the PM to compete production contracts
between the team members, starting with lot 3. [Ref. 42:pp. 3-4]
Along with the significant strategy adjustment, 1987 also marked
the passage of several program hurdles. The Operational Requirements
Document (ORD) (formerly known as Required Operational Capabilities
(ROC) document), and the first LHX Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)
(formerly known as Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis) were
released. Additionally, the program's MS I DAB review was scheduled for
right after the Christmas holidays in January, 1988. [Ref. 5:p.5]
a. Operational Requirements Document
In 1987, the United States Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC),
representing the using aviation community, produced the official ORD
detailing the desired operational requirements. It confirmed the
necessity to replace existing light reconnaissance and utility fleet and
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thus correct existing deficiencies. The ORD addressed key system
characteristics the using community felt were vital to fielding a new
aircraft. They included: [Ref. 5:p.5]
Single airframe for both scout and attack mission.
D 1260nm self-deployability capability with a 30 minute fuel
reserve.
Transportability requirement to fit within Air Force C-141, C-
17, and C-5 aircraft.
D Improved hot day performance (at 4000 ft and 95 degrees
Fahrenheit) over current light fleet.
Increased speed and endurance of 170 knots (kts) at
intermediate rated power (IRP).
D Improved survivability through reduced visual, aural, and IR
signatures and crashworthiness (vertical impact of 38 feet per
second )
TRADOC approved the ORD along with a proposed
Operational and Organizational plan on March 11 th
,
1987. [Ref. 25] The
TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine acknowledged the importance
and inherent difficulty in performing the reconnaissance mission and
informed USAAVNC that fixing Army reconnaissance deficiencies must
be the number-one priority. He directed LHX requirements to place




An AOA for the LHX began in 1985 and was completed in
March 1987. The AOA was a comprehensive analytical effort conducted
to determine the most cost and operationally-effective alternative
replacement to the AH-1, OH-58 A/C, and UH-1 aircraft. Its release in
1987 coincided with the upcoming MS I decision scheduled for 1988.
The analysis considered every facet of operations and support
requirements, to include threat, operational employment, logistics, man-
machine interface, training, and cost. [Ref. 5:pp.5-6]
Current and developmental variants were included in the
alternative analysis. The four system alternatives included: [Ref. 44:p.9]
D Alternative 1 - AH-1+ (+ indicates Reliability, Availability, and
Maintainability (RAM) and safety product improvements), OH-
58 A/C+, andUH-l +
D Alternative 2 - AH-64+ (+ includes operational improvements),
OH-58C+, and UH-60+
D Alternative 3 - LHX scout, attack, and utility helicopters
Alternative 4 - Tiltrotor scout, attack, and utility aircraft.
Each alternative was modeled in the current Air Land Battle
doctrine, concentrating on a mid-intensity European Warsaw Pact
scenario. In addition, a Southwest Asia scenario was also modeled
against second-tier Soviet equipment. [Ref. 5:p. 5] The AOA concluded
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that existing aircraft could not be economically modernized, and
therefore alternatives one and two were dismissed. The advanced
technology helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft both demonstrated substantial
improvements in key areas such as survivability, deployability,
sustainability, supportability, and cost of ownership. However, concern
over tiltrotor technical feasibility and developmental costs led to a
decision to support alternative three, development of an advanced
technology rotorcraft. [Ref. 45]
The month following release of the AOA, OSD expressed
concern over the lack of a definitive selection for the LHX design and
directed that independent studies be conducted to confirm the results of
the original analysis. Both the RAND Corporation and the Institute for
Defense Analysis (IDA) conducted independent analysis of the LHX issue,
assessing the capabilities and appropriateness of the four Army
alternatives. An advanced helicopter design was confirmed by both
organizations to be the most operationally-effective alternative and the
design with the lowest 20-year lifecycle costs. [Ref. 5:p. 6]
It was now clear that the future of LHX would focus on a
conventional helicopter capability. While tiltrotor proponents would
criticize this decision for its lack of vision, the program would undergo a
battery of reviews confirming the Army's choice. [Ref. 46]
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6. Milestone I
What started out as an event-filled year ended with the realization
that the LHX program, as structured, would be difficult and expensive to
attain. As Congress began its annual budget debates in 1987, the LHX
program was confronted with a skeptical Congress. Key members of the
House Armed Services Committee, such as ranking Republican
Representative William L. Dickinson, voiced strong concern over the
Army's willingness to fund LHX by cutting back on the previously
planned production of Black Hawks and Apaches. As a result, the final
FY88 Appropriations Bill only allotted $70 million of the $267 million
requested for development for the LHX. [Ref. 47:p. 421]
The effect of House budget decision was felt in January 1988 when
the program underwent an Army Aviation Modernization DAB review,
chaired by the USD(A), Robert B. Costello. The purpose of the board was
to review the status of the LHX program as well as the Army Aviation
Modernization Plan about which Congress had expressed concern. The
board determined that under the current and forecasted budgets, the
Army could not afford the LHX. [Ref. 48:p. 20]
Citing problems with affordability, the Acquisition Decision
Memorandum (ADM) signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense
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(DEPSECDEF) William H. Taft, informed the Army that the LHX is "no
longer a viable program" and that it should refocus to develop and
acquire a low-cost, light-weight scout/ attack aircraft. The PM was given
until the end of the upcoming summer to prepare for a new MS I DAB
review. Developmental efforts were directed to focus on an austere PDRR
and to emphasize risk-reduction efforts in the MEP development. [Ref.
48:p. 20] Any desires the Army had of developing a family of helicopters
ended when the DEPSECDEF eliminated the utility version of the LHX
from the acquisition plan. [Ref. 5:p. 6]
Program officials immediately began to adjust their program focus,
centering on the near-term milestone of a summer DAB. The revised
acquisition strategy emphasized contractor risk reduction efforts by
better defining MEP architecture and requiring demonstrated
performance of key MEP components, such as the TAS, 2d generation
FLIR focal plane array, and high resolution day (TV) sensor. Competitive
18-month (later changed to 23-month) PDRR contracts awarded to both
teams of contractors required design and engineering of preliminary
aircraft mockups and major systems such as drivetrain and flight control
systems. Due to budgetary constraints, the revised strategy would not
require a flyoff between competing designs. However, substantiation of
proposed aircraft design and key system performance through "bread"
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and "brass-board" demonstrations, testing, and simulation was required.
[Ref. 49:p.247] Down-select to a single contractor team would occur at
the end of PDRR and precede a planned 69-month EMD phase. [Ref.
44:p. 12]
The LHX program received a successful MS I decision in June
1988. The Government awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts to
Boeing/ Sikorsky and McDonnell/ Bell contracting teams in November for
$167,124,000 and $167,818,000, respectively. The approved schedule
included source selection of one contracting team and a MS II decision in
December 1990, first flight in August 1993, and Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) in November 1996. Estimated R&D costs in FY89
dollars were $3.3 billion. Production costs were expected to run over $24
billion for a reduced purchase of 2096 aircraft. [Ref. 50:p.24-28]
Congress's support for the restructured program as well as the Army's
Aviation Modernization plan had apparently returned, as it approved all
of the $125 million requested in the President's FY89 budget. [Ref.
51:p.669]
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D. PROGRAM DEFINITION AND RISK REDUCTION - THE EARLY
YEARS
While 1987 had ended on a pessimistic note, 1988 ended with the
program in a solid position. The DAB approved program entry into
PDRR, and contracts were issued to both competing teams in June.
Congress supported the Army's Aviation Modernization plan and the LHX
program during the last round of budget debates, and the
Boeing/ Sikorsky team unveiled its preliminary design in October. [Ref.
52:p. 31]
As 1990 approached, the dawn of a new decade brought with it,
among other things, a new era of relaxed U.S. - Soviet Union relations,
which presented OSD with extensive challenges. The fall of the Berlin
Wall and German reunification were just two of the tremendous events
that transpired to redirect the Pentagon's direction and focus. President
George Bush and his Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, were faced
with the challenge of both reaping the benefits of winning the Cold War,
and maintaining a healthy defense budget.
1. Major Aircraft Review
The changing world order prompted the Secretary of Defense to
instruct the Pentagon to conduct a Major Aircraft Review (MAR) in June
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1990. The intent of the MAR was to assess the affordability and
requirement for several major defense systems, among them the recently
renamed LH (formerly LHX). The results, validated by the JROC,
confirmed previous assessments of Army Aviation deficiencies; however,
it also directed more program restructuring. [Ref. 5: p. 7]
The SECDEF required an extension of PDRR for two additional
years, and contract modifications to allow for complete testing of the
prototypes prior to entering EMD. The effects of the SECDEF decision
deferred MS II and production for two years, slipped IOC from 1996 to
1998, and further reduced the total aircraft purchase from 2,096 to
1,292. [Ref. 44:p.l4] The program slippage was an apparent attempt by
the SECDEF to allow additional time to prove-out critical system
components, and once again reduce overall funding commitments.
2. PDRR Prototype Phase
On April 12, 1991, after an extensive source selection process, the
Army awarded a cost-plus-incentive-fee with award fee (CPIF/AF) PDRR
prototype contract to the Boeing/ Sikorsky contractor team. The PDRR
prototype contract period of performance was scheduled for 52 months,
with an option for a 39-month EMD phase. Milestones for this phase
included prototype first flight in August 1994, and IOC in December
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1998. The total number of aircraft was expected to be 1292. [Ref.
44:p.l5] The contract included provisions for four prototypes, plus a
static test article (STA) for MEP testing, and a propulsion system test-bed
(PSTB) for testing all dynamic components on the aircraft. [Ref. 26] On
the 15th of April, the Army officially designated the LH as the
reconnaissance and attack RAH-66 Comanche. [Ref. 44:p.l5]
The purpose of the Comanche PDRR prototype phase was to
finalize the aircraft design and to manufacture prototypes.
Comprehensive flight and static system testing were to demonstrate
system maturity and assist in reducing risk. The scope of the program
was limited to PDRR activities, with a focus on the design, engineering,
and supportability of the total system requirement. The original program
goals represented design constraints for the contractor. [Ref. 44:p. 15]
The far-reaching effects of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and
the Soviet Union became markedly evident in the first few years of the
new decade, as the President and SECDEF struggled to balance
shrinking budgets and ambiguous national security requirements. In an
attempt to ensure the future of U.S. military technological superiority,
the SECDEF announced during the budget preparation of 1992, that the
Pentagon would continue to fund development of next-generation
weapons. However, support for development did not guarantee support
59
for production. As a result, the new Comanche PM, BG Orlin Mullen,
was directed to continue research and development of the aircraft, but to
defer indefinitely any plans for production. [Ref. 53:pp.20-22]
3. 1992 Restructure - REPLAN I
The impact of the SECDEF's directive was both familiar and
significant. Renewed emphasis was placed on proving-out all critical
components, including the avionics, T800 engines, and Longbow
millimeter-wave radar fire control system. [Ref. 44:p. 17] The prototype
phase was increased by over two years, from 1995 to 1997. Prototype
production fell from four to three, and the static test-bed was cancelled
altogether. The first prototype flight was pushed out one year to August
1995 [Ref. 53:pp. 20-21] The Army lost the pricing arrangements
negotiated in its April 1991 contract, including the option to transition
the program into EMD. [Ref. 44:p. 19]
Final approval for the new acquisition strategy was granted in the
ADM signed by the USD(A), Donald Yockey, on December 15, 1992. The
ADM authorized General Mullen to proceed with the program, subject to
the following constraints: The manufacture of three prototypes, flight
testing of T800 growth engines, and additional effort on the proposed
gun. PDRR phase was now stretched to 78 months (Apr91-Oct97) and
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EMD, while not authorized, was planned for 60 months and estimated at
$2,882 billion. [Ref. 44:pp. 18-19] In all, the OSD directed restructure
would result in an increase of $1.4 billion in RDT&E costs. [Ref. 54]
Almost immediately, the new program began to experience funding
shortages. In February 1993, a review of EMD funding requirements
highlighted a shortfall of $424 million. The following month, a program
budget decision (PBD) decreased FY94 funding for Comanche by an
additional $76 million, of which $11.1 million was for inflation reduction
alone. Combined with a FY95 reduction of $19 million, the new PDRR
prototype phase was under-funded by $95 million. [Ref. 44:pl9]
Growing anxiety over the budget shortfall prompted a meeting
between the PM and Boeing Sikorsky in September 1993. After having
just struggled through a program restructuring, each party was
determined to develop a new, less-expensive approach to restructuring
the program to fit current budget profiles. Minimal disruption of
program operations was critical.
To reduce FY94 spending, the program implemented the following
deferrals: [Ref. 44 :p. 20]
D Program commonality effort for FY94 and FY95
D Growth engine integration effort
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D Training development
Deleted from the PDRR phase was Longbow Radar integration.
The deferrals and deletions reduced program spending for FY94 by $65
million. Acknowledging the remaining shortfall, Boeing Sikorsky also
announced a schedule slip of three months. Contract completion was
now contingent upon future years' funding. [Ref. 44:pp. 18-19]
4. Program Streamlining - REPLAN II
Program officials spent the majority of 1993 attempting to
streamline the Comanche acquisition process in an effort to merge PDRR
and EMD activities. The intent of the streamlining process was to reduce
acquisition costs and expedite IOC. Boeing Sikorsky was directed to
assess key areas of the streamlining initiatives, such as preparing
program schedules, and providing funding requirements and plans for
contractor logistical support programs. Additionally, the contractors
were instructed to identify potential commercial approaches that could
be applied to the acquisition strategy. [Ref. 44:pp: 20-21]
On February 16, 1994, the Acting USD(A), R. Noel Longuemare,
authorized the PM to begin implementation of streamlining initiatives.
The authorization limited the PM to "short-term redirection of the PDRR
contractual efforts" for FY94 and FY95. The objectives of the
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streamlining effort included performing cost-benefit tradeoffs, planning
for the production phase, and clearly documented cost reduction
analysis based on streamlining initiatives. [Ref. 44:p. 21] General
Mullens provided Boeing Sikorsky with specific redirection guidance, for
which an additional $5 million was added to the FY94 budget. The tasks
included: [Ref. 44:pp. 22-23]
Stop development of prototype three
Do not include a reduction in communication capabilities or fail
to integrate upgraded capabilities as a result of streamlining
Provide limited support to Longbow Radar development to




1994 the Boeing Sikorsky team submitted their new
plan. A month later, the DAB Conventional Systems Committee (CSC)
met to review the streamlined proposal. [Ref. 44:p. 23] The CSC findings
were generally favorable. There was some concern, however, that the
program was carrying too much risk, due to both concurrency and the
accumulation of engineering changes. The PM addressed these concerns
by slowing proposed development and production output. The planned
production output for FYOO - FY05 is listed in Table 2.
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Table 2. 1992 Proposed Restructure Production Output







Source: Developed by author with information from [Ref. 55:p.20
The new strategy moved up the first article delivery by one year.
The planned first flight was moved from November 1995 to early 1996.
[Ref. 55:p. 20]
5. ORD Update
Concurrent with the Program Management Office (PMO)
streamlining initiatives, the Comanche TRADOC System Manager (TSM)
began converting the original ORD to the new format, as prescribed by
DoD 5000.2. A major shift in the National Military Strategy, the breakup
of the Soviet Union, changing technology, and lessons learned from
recent military operations, all served to validate the need to review and
update the six-year-old operational requirement. In all, nine new
requirements were added, and twenty-three were changed or clarified.
The Army approved the revised ORD on April 28, 1993. [Ref. 5: p. 8]
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In 1993, the recently appointed SECDEF, Les Aspin directed a
comprehensive analysis of the national defense strategy, as well as the
doctrine, force structure, and modernization plans of the four services.
Entitled the Bottoms Up Review (BUR), Aspin's analysis identified the
Comanche as both a technological and cost risk, due to the significant
developmental work still remaining. The BUR advised careful oversight
of the program. Nevertheless, it did confirm the criticality of timely
battlefield intelligence. [Ref. 5:p. 8]
E. PDRR - THE LATER YEARS
On August 12th
, 1994, BG Orlin Mullen retired and Colonel James
Snider was appointed as Acting PM. Seven days later, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF), John Deutch, directed the Army to
develop alternatives that would lead to the termination of the Comanche
program. [Ref. 44 :p. 23] Despite being described as the Army's number
one acquisition priority, Comanche's cost made it a high-profile target for
cancellation.
The Clinton administration's five-year budget plan for
modernization alarmed senior Army leadership. Of particular concern
was the state of the helicopter industry, and the effect program
cancellation would have on it. With Black Hawk production scheduled to
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end in 1996, the industry would have no new military aircraft in
production. The Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(RDA), Lieutenant General William Forster, emphasized in a 1994
interview that Army modernization budgets had steadily dropped and
would have required a FY96 budget increase of $600 million to fund
current modernization plans. [Ref. 56:p. 102]
In October, the USD(A), Dr. Paul Kaminsky, directed Colonel
Snider to implement the streamlining plans as briefed to the CSC by the
now retired General Mullen. Specific instructions included: [Ref. 44 :p.
24]
D Updating the AOA to measure the effects streamlining would
have on operational effectiveness
D Performing analysis of system design maturity to ensure RAM
and performance thresholds are met
Developing plans for a second operational test and evaluation of
aircraft modified with Longbow Radar
D Preparing an explanation of how the contractor's claim of a
10,000-hour airframe life would be confirmed.
1. Early Operational Capability
Prior to implementation of the streamlining program, the SECDEF
issued a December 9th directive to once again restructure the Comanche
program. Largely attributable to DEPSECDEF Deutch, the directive was
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part of a larger package of defense cancellations or restructures and
effectively eliminated production of the Comanche. Deutch's move was
intended to ease Army budget pressures. However, faced with the
possible cancellation of two high-profile systems, the Comanche and the
Advanced Field Artillery System, the Army chose to sacrifice the former.
[Ref. 57:p. 18]
A PDM, issued on December 16th
,
restructured the Comanche into
an industrial and technology-based program. The program retained the
two flyable prototypes from the previous restructure. However,
production was deferred indefinitely. Colonel Snider was given until
March 30, 1995, to present the restructured plan to the DAB. [Ref. 44 :p.
25]
As part of developing a sound acquisition strategy, one compliant
with the December 16th PDM, Colonel Snider met in Seattle, Washington,
with the Aviation Program Executive Officer (PEO), Major General DeWitt
T. Irby, the ASA (RDA) Gilbert Decker, and the Army Chief of Staff,
General Gordon R. Sullivan. Determined to develop a strategy that
would sustain the program in the near-term, and if funding became
available, allow it to transition into eventual production, the group
sketched out a plan to salvage the Comanche.
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The resultant plan, dubbed the Early Operational Capability (EOC)
program, was rooted in their belief that if the program could manage to
provide the Army with a portion of the aircraft's capabilities, the program
would in turn sell itself to OSD and the Army. Colonel Snider felt that by
demonstrating the program's ability to produce an aircraft, even one with
reduced capabilities, senior policy makers and Army leadership would
see the value of the program, and once again support funding it into
production. [Ref. 46]
The EOC plan continued development of the Comanche, and
provided, by 2001, for the manufacture of six aircraft for test and
evaluation. [Ref. 56:p. 104] The EOC aircraft would not be production-
model aircraft, but they would be capable of demonstrating at a reduced
level, flight and reconnaissance capability. Armament systems would not
be included, nor would the aircraft have the advanced targeting system
included in the MEP. Most importantly, the accelerated development
program would be accomplished within the reduced budgets. [Ref. 46]
On March 16th
, 1995, the CSC was briefed on the EOC details.
The CSC approved the EOC plan and recommended approval to Dr.
Kaminsky. On the 21 st
,
Dr. Kaminsky approved the newly restructured
program and the exit criteria for MS II. [Ref. 44:p. 25]
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The new program schedule included awarding an EOC contract in
January 1997, with aircraft delivery in late 2001. Development of the
MEP was divided into two phases. Phase one provided for development
of the reconnaissance sensors to be integrated into the EOC aircraft.
Phase two involved development of the weapon systems and was deferred
until the 2000-2003 timeframe. Reconnaissance capable EOC aircraft
were scheduled, beginning in 2002, to take part in a two-year operational
test. By 2004, the aircraft weapon systems would be integrated. Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) was scheduled for 2005-06,
and IOC was now scheduled for 2006. [Ref. 30:p. 36]
On January 2nd
, 1996, Boeing Sikorsky and Government personnel
began writing the Statement of Work (SOW) and the performance weapon
system specification, using an "Alpha Contracting" approach 1 . [Ref. 44:p.
25] Contract negotiation continued throughout the remainder of 1996.
One area of contention involved $40 million authorized in the FY97
budget that was currently on the Congressional recission list. The result
of the lost funding required delaying the installation of several
reconnaissance systems from the EOC aircraft into the LRIP aircraft.
1 Alpha contracting is an acquisition streamlining technique involving the use of
teaming (Government and contractor) to prepare, evaluate, and award proposals. The
intent of alpha contracting is to substantially reduce the time spent on developing
contract proposals using the traditional approach. [Army Acq Reform Guidebook : 14]
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The final contract was agreed upon on January 1, 1997, and
included two prototypes and six EOC aircraft. Delivery of all EOC
aircraft was expected by September 2002. The new contract vehicle was
a cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF), with a 10% award fee based on quarterly
performance reviews. Total contract value was $3.7 billion. [Ref. 44:p.
26]
Key to the success of the EOC plan was to produce six
reconnaissance capable aircraft for early user evaluation, and to achieve
this within the same constrained budget. The PM instituted the EOC
plan following approval by the USD(A) in March 1995. Concurrent with
the strategy shift, the joint venture of Boeing Sikorsky began a public
relations blitz. Comanche mockups and simulators began appearing at
every major OSD activity. The well-known military fiction writer, Tom
Clancy, was given, through advanced simulation, a first-hand
demonstration of the Comanche's capabilities. He was so impressed with
the system that Boeing Sikorsky enlisted him to speak on behalf of the
aircraft and its relevance on the future battlefield. Without payment or
compensation, Clancy narrated a promotional film and made several
public appearances on behalf of the program. [Ref. 46]
The efforts of the PM and Boeing Sikorsky were rewarded over the
course of the next year with a wave of support from Congress and OSD.
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On May 25, 1995, Boeing Sikorsky rolled out the first prototype aircraft.
[Ref. 26] Later in the year, declaring the President's Army modernization
budget did not adequately support the Comanche, and thus jeopardized
the Army's future, Congress increased the program's FY96 budget by
$100 million, to $299 million. [Ref. 58:p. 9-6]
On January 4, 1996, the Comanche helicopter made its maiden
flight. The thirty-six minute flight took place at the Sikorsky Aircraft test
facility in West Palm Beach, Florida. [Ref. 30:p. 35] By October, the
aircraft had accumulated seven hours of flight-testing, and achieved a
forward airspeed of over 100 kts. [Ref. 26] Extensive use of telemetry to
transmit and process flight data during the test-flight, allowed for
accelerated testing . [Ref. 59] By late 1997, the prototype had logged 62
flight hours and achieved a speed of 170 kts in forward flight, and
demonstrated 45 kts in both rearward and sideways flight. [Ref. 26]
2. Pre-production Prototype Program
In mid-July, 1998, the new PM, Brigadier General Joseph
Bergantz, became concerned with the EOC program. He sensed in the
aviation community a growing disenchantment with the program, as it
provided less than optimal (that is, reconnaissance only) aircraft to the
user. In particular, there was growing concern that because the aircraft
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were not production quality, they would, when fielded, create a poor
perception of the Comanche in the minds of the user. The unintended
result would be a loss of support for the program. Additionally, a
generally favorable opinion of the program at senior OSD levels and in
Congress provided an appropriate opportunity to modify the program.
[Ref. 59]
As a result, General Bergantz proposed the fifth restructure in
program history. The new strategy complied with the same funding
constraints placed on the EOC plan, but accelerated the development of
the MEP and Longbow Radar. [Ref. 59] The Comanche Pre-production
Prototype (PPP) Program required Boeing Sikorsky to produce fourteen
aircraft (six pre-production and eight IOT&E) beginning in 2003, a two-
year slip from the EOC program. Development of the full armament and
reconnaissance MEP, as well as the Longbow Radar, would be expedited
and integrated on the PPP aircraft. [Ref. 60:p. 2]
The scope of BG Bergantz's restructure required the aviation
community's vote of confidence. The Army would not receive the
anticipated EOC aircraft in 2002. Instead, delivery was scheduled to
begin in 2003. Additionally, six PPP aircraft and eight IOT&E aircraft
would replace the six EOC aircraft. While it appeared the PPP program
offered the user significantly more aircraft, the eight IOT&E aircraft were
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actually two less than the number originally scheduled for IOT&E.
Despite the slip in the schedule, General Bergantz was offering the Army
production-configured aircraft, to include the new Longbow radar,
(originally scheduled for production lot six) utilizing the existing EOC
program funding resources.
The revised schedule anticipated a MS II DAB Review in March
2000, a nineteen-month acceleration. The EMD effort would center on
full MEP development, as well as Longbow integration. Four PPP aircraft,
one with radar, would take part in a limited user test, scheduled for
FY05. Aircraft numbers seven through fourteen, would be production
equivalents, and take part in the previously scheduled FY06 IOT&E.
General Bergantz briefed the Overarching Integrated Product Team
(OIPT) in June 1998, and the program received the approval of the USD
(A&T), Dr. Jacques Gansler, on July 27, 1998. [Ref. 60:p. 3-6]
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter discussed the history of the RAH-66 Comanche
Helicopter program, beginning with the AAMAA in 1981. The program
has endured an on-again-off-again relationship with Congress, OSD, and
even the Army. A lack of determined support by these agencies has
manifested itself into a perpetually adjusting acquisition strategy. The
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results can be seen in Table 3, which illustrates the difficulties and
impact associated with the program's five restructures.










None FY86 $3.2B FY92 - No PDRR




FY88 FY90 $3.9B FY97 Utility variant dropped
- 23 month PDRR added to
strategy




EMD scheduled for 69 months
Restructure
#2 1990
FY88 FY95 $5.3B FY99 - PDRR extended to 52 months
- PDRR two phases:
Phase one - competitive
development








FY88 FY98 $6.7B FY03 PDRR extended to 78 months
Added Longbow requirement
Prove out all critical
components
Prototype quantity reduced
from four to three






FY88 FY02 $7.8B FY06 Longbow broken out and
planned as P3I (to FY09)
6 Reconnaissance capable
EOC aircraft, deliverable by
FY01






FY88 FY00 $8.3B FY06 Cancels EOC aircraft
Accelerates Longbow and MEP
integration to first lot
14 Production quality aircraft
beginning 2003
Source: Developed by author; cost data from 1999 PMO Briefing [Ref. 541
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The table portrays the results of each of the Comanche's five major
restructurings. Of significance is the increase of over $4 billion in
RDT&E costs. Despite this significant increase, it appears the only real
change from the original program is the loss of the utility aircraft, a
reduction in procurement quantity from 4,500 to 1,292, the addition of
the Longbow radar, and an IOC date that has been pushed back from
FY92 to FY06.
The Comanche is undoubtedly a victim of the turbulent acquisition
environment of the 1980s and 1990s. However, several elements have
combined to keep the program afloat, and even progressing. To begin
with, the Army Aviation community has stood firmly in support of the
program, and has taken an active role in requirements validation.
Secondly, despite the occurrence of five program restructurings, each of
them can be linked to affordability issues or as in the PPP program,
utilization of best practices. Government and contractor personnel have
maintained a disciplined and innovative approach to management
throughout the history of the program. Finally, the downsizing of the
services has focused attention on the defense industry, and in particular
the aerospace industry. This was illustrated by Congressional concern
over the Army's aviation modernization plans, and the fluctuation of the
Comanche's budget.
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In the next chapter, I will analyze the significant events of the
program history, and discuss how the program retained its viability and
status as one of the Army's primary acquisitions for the 21 st Century.
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V. ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
DoD has been historically criticized for a painfull}'' slow acquisition
process. [Ref. 1] [Ref. 2] [Ref. 3] The Comanche, however, appears to
have broken new ground in this regard. Few programs that can trace
their roots back to 1981 are still waiting to enter EMD. The Air Force's
F-22 Fighter, for example, was conceived about the same time as
Comanche. It successfully entered EMD in 1991. [Ref. 33:p. 160]
The program's history has been unpredictable if nothing else. The
on-again, off-again support for the Comanche has unquestionably
resulted in schedule slippages and increased costs. Despite the
changing threats, rising costs, and long delays, the Comanche stands at
a major threshold. Almost 20 years after its inception, it appears poised
to begin a $3.1 billion EMD effort. [Ref. 61] Thus begins a new era in the
Comanche program. However, it is the past which is of interest, and
begs the question: What is it about the RAH-66 Comanche program that
has allowed it to withstand all of the events of its past, and yet stand
ready today to face its MS II review?
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Three reasons stand out from the prior historical discussion of the
program. Each plays a key role in understanding the forces at work
behind Comanche. First and foremost, while events in the world have
changed the threat facing the Army, its requirement for accurate and
timely intelligence, which Comanche is designed to provide, has
remained unchanged. Secondly, although both cost and schedule have
become an issue with the program, it has been innovative, proactive
program management by both government and contractors, which is
responsible for keeping the program on track. Finally, without any new
military helicopters under development, the Comanche represents the
only new development in a dwindling U. S. helicopter industrial base. Its
cancellation would leave industry only DoD aircraft modification and
production contracts.
B. REQUIREMENTS
In 1982, the AAMAA recognized the deficiencies of the Army's light
observation and attack helicopters. It determined, that when placed on a
notional 1990s battlefield, the current fleet of light helicopters was
tactically obsolete and incapable of performing its wartime
reconnaissance tasks. [Ref. 5:p. 2] In particular, these aircraft did not
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possess the technology to operate and survive in the high-threat
environment envisioned for the future. [Ref. 42::p. 1]
With that understanding, the combat developers began the process
of determining the requirements for the LHX and later the Comanche.
Doctrine, training, organization, and material solutions were all assessed
to determine the most cost-effective resolution to the deficiency. The
final determination required a material solution, and thus the LHX
program was established.
As the world has changed, so has the Army's approach to
defending the interests of the country. However, the need for timely,
accurate intelligence data has not changed. Recent operations in Kosovo
illustrated an inability for U.S. Commanders to obtain all of the vital
intelligence they required, through the exclusive use of satellite imagery,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), or fast-moving fixed-wing aircraft. In a
prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary
of Defense, William S. Cohen, commented on lessons-learned from
Kosovo. The Secretary stated: "The operation also highlighted the
importance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance — and the
fact that the assets that provide these essential elements of success are
in short supply." [Ref. 62] It appears evident, that as the Army prepares
to celebrate the 20th anniversary of its formal requirement for a new
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reconnaissance helicopter, OSD and senior Army leadership still believe
the same need exists today. More importantly, JROC approval and
several AOAs indicate the Comanche fulfills those requirements.
1. Comanche TSM
The Comanche TRADOC System Manager (TSM) represents the
using community in the development of the RAH-66. By definition, the
TSM is responsible for coordinating the efforts of the PMO, user, and
trainer in the life-cycle management of a system. [Ref. 62] In the case of
TSM Comanche, active participation from the earliest stages of the
program has been a key component to maintaining a positive
relationship between the using community and the PMO. Equally
important, the TSM's participation ensured a sense of joint ownership in
the program.
This mutually supportive relationship has created a bridge
between the two organizations that has ensured an open channel of
communication. The results include relatively stable performance
requirements and a consistent level of support from the aviation
community. Evidence of this is seen in the following illustrations.
Realizing the importance of establishing a positive relationship
with the user, Comanche PMs have made a concerted effort to ensure
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TRADOC involvement in program decisions. This included using
program funds to guarantee TSM representation at critical program
events. [Ref. 14] Additionally, representatives from the PMO and TSM
office were based at several contractor locations throughout the U.S. For
example, along with several personnel from the PMO, a senior aviation
warrant officer and non-commissioned (NCO) officer representing the
TSM, were present at the Comanche Developmental Flight Center in West
Palm Beach, Florida. Their mission was to provide a resource for the
contractor on supportability and operational suitability.
While operational aircraft have yet to materialize, the aviation
community has not given up on the program. In fact, program
management involvement by TSM personnel has given them a unique
insight into the acquisition strategy and a sense of ownership in the
ultimate product. The effect of this association has resulted in the
aviation community standing firmly behind the Comanche.
2. Requirements Confirmation
From the very earliest stages of program development, the LHX has
undergone significant analysis of cost and operational effectiveness
factors. From 1985 to 1987, TRADOC conducted the first AOA. The
analysis examined various existing and developmental alternatives. The
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analysis concluded that both advanced technology helicopters and
tiltrotor aircraft presented operationally sound alternatives; however, the
tiltrotor was deemed too expensive, and therefore the helicopter was
recommended. [Ref. 45]
Expressing concern as to the conclusiveness of the first AOA, the
USD(A) required a second, external AOA be conducted on the LHX. The
RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analysis were both
contracted to perform the analysis. Their conclusions were the same as
TRADOC's. It appears evident that in the early stages of the program,
government and independent analysis confirmed the advanced helicopter
as the proper choice to fulfill the armed reconnaissance requirement. In
1990, a second AOA conducted by TRADOC would conclude with similar
results. [Ref. 5:p. 6] The Comanche was clearly the most cost and
operationally efficient choice for the Army.
Over the next several years, several OSD level reviews would again
confirm the Comanche as the appropriate reconnaissance platform for
the Army. In 1990, a Major Aircraft Review (MAR), conducted by OSD,
evaluated the requirement for and affordability of Comanche. While
reducing the total number of aircraft procured, the MAR did validate the
Army's reconnaissance requirement and its choice of aircraft. [Ref. 44:p.
16] Former SECDEF Les Aspin's 1993 Bottoms Up Review (BUR),
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confirmed the significant role of reconnaissance during Operation Desert
Storm, and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review affirmed the necessity
of Comanche to implement the Army's Force XXI doctrine. [Ref. 5:pp. 8-
9] These final reviews came in the aftermath of the weighty events that
occurred in Europe during the 90s. Evidence clearly indicates that the
Army's response to correcting its reconnaissance deficiency was the
appropriate one.
C. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
From the beginning, each Comanche PM has struggled to ensure
the program remained both well managed and relevant. Despite the
turmoil experienced throughout the program's history, the PMs and
contractors have managed to keep the program on track in terms of cost
and schedule. Key to the program's success has been the use of several
innovative management techniques.
1. BG Andreson and the Early Years
As essentially the first PM, BG Andreson enjoyed a relatively more
supportive environment than his predecessors. President Ronald Reagan
had begun the process of building up America's military through the
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acquisition of new and better weapons. Budgets were on the rise and
support for Comanche both in OSD and the Army was clearly evident.
Nevertheless, the environment facing General Andreson provided
its own challenges. The measures taken by Andreson during these early
years set the stage for how the program would progress and how it would
be viewed outside of the acquisition community as well as outside of the
Army.
An example of Andreson's innovative contributions to the
development of the Comanche program was the use of planned
competition through both the EMD and Production phases. Competition
in EMD was to be maintained between industry teams and would
conclude with the down-selection to one team for production. Once in
production, the winning team members would separate and compete
with each other for subsequent production contracts. Andreson also
utilized this technique for the LHX engine, which was to be contracted for
separately. Although the drastically reduced procurement quantities
presently scheduled no longer make this an affordable option, it sought
to maintain competition throughout the lifecycle of the program, and to
ensure the lowest cost to the Army. As such, the program initially
possessed tremendous appeal as a model procurement program to senior
Army, OSD, and Congressional leadership. [Ref. 64:p. 1]
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General Andreson's acquisition strategy for the PDRR prototype
phase was also a departure from other major system acquisition
strategies. Its design provided the teams significant freedom to conduct
tradeoffs in the Comanche's development. [Ref. 65:p. 29] Entitled the
"Design Flexibility Clause," this acquisition streamlining measure
provided the contractor a limited number of PMO and user-defined goals.
For example, the Comanche established goals of: [REF. 65:p.29]
An empty weight of 7,774 pounds,
D A flyaway cost of $9.3 million,
The use of twin T800 engines.
The PM, user, and contractors reached agreement on performance
ranges for empty weight, flight performance, radar detectability,
crashworthiness, and ballistic tolerance. [Ref. 65:p. 29] The clause
allowed the contractor to make tradeoffs without enduring time-
consuming and expensive contract modifications. If, for example, the
contractor identified a design-to-cost improvement that improved overall
system performance even though it increased aircraft weight, it was
permitted to make the change. [Ref. 64:p. 2]] The PM and contractor
believed design flexibility provided cost-saving opportunities and assisted
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in reducing performance and technical risk without negatively impacting
the program.
The contract vehicle provided an incentive to the contractor to
carefully manage the Design Flexibility Clause. If performance ranges
were breached, the contractor risked loss of award fees. Conversely, if
tradeoffs resulted in optimizing the balance between costs and
performance, supportability, and producibility, the contractor earned
increased award fee. Additionally, the contractor agreed to share in all
cost overruns, fix all failures during development, and if necessary, pay
for correcting reliability problems using a percentage of production
profits. [Ref. 65:p. 29-30]
The Design Flexibility Clause allowed the contractor to perform
necessary tradeoffs in order to achieve program goals, as long as
performance stayed within mutually agreed upon ranges. This level of
autonomy, along with the contract award incentive, placed the contractor
in a unique position. Similar to their counterparts in commercial
industries, Boeing Sikorsky was no longer responsible for producing
what their potential buyer told them to manufacture, but rather for the
end product their buyer actually wanted.
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2. BG Mullen and Streamlining Initiatives
When BG Mullen assumed the position of Program Manager in
June 1991, Comanche was enjoying a brief respite from the turmoil of
the first ten years. Prior to BG Andreson's departure, the first milestone
had been successfully passed and the PDRR contract with Boeing
Sikorsky signed. This fortuitous timing allowed BG Mullen to institute
several innovative measures; however, the period of relative calm was
short-lived.
a. Teaming
While the history of relationships between DoD and
contractors may be characterized as adversarial, the Comanche PM and
Boeing/ Sikorsky made a concerted effort to develop a "teaming"
approach to management. While not the first program to utilize an
Integrated Product Team (IPT) approach, immediately following down-
selection the Comanche program centered its approach on managing the
program around its Product Development Teams (PDTs). A collaborative
group of contractors and government experts, the PDTs worked together
to solve problems spanning the entire spectrum of design, development,
and production [Ref. 64 :p. 2]
87
When combined with advanced computer-based design
technologies, the effort has been very effective. The concurrent approach
allowed for simplified program communication that assisted in cost-
saving ideas and elimination of errors. An example of the PDT efficiency
involved the manufacture of prototype number one. Open lines of
communication between PDT members and the use of computer-based
production parameters, assisted in compensating for the natural
confusion created by two companies operating together for the first time.
Fabricated on production tooling, the airframe required less than 40
percent of the allocated man-hours.
Even more demonstrative of the teaming benefits was
assembly of the forward and aft fuselage sections. Sikorsky
manufactured the forward assembly structure in its Stratford,
Connecticut plant; in Philadelphia, Boeing had responsibility for the aft
fuselage and the shrouded tailrotor. When the components came
together for the first time at the final assembly facility, they fit together
perfectly. [Ref. 64:p. 2] While advanced computer-aided manufacturing
(CAD) was, to a great extent, responsible for the success of this process,
the teaming approach utilized by the program office facilitated the




Teaming was not confined to the engineering and scientific
tasks. Beginning with the down-selection to one contracting team, the
Army maintained a role as an integral member of the testing team,
advocating both operational and maintenance interests. [Ref. 64]
Joining with the prime and sub-contractors, the program office formed
the Comanche Combined Test Team (CTT). Through the cohesive effort
of each member's test communities, the CTT worked together to plan and
execute test programs. CTT members shared in executing test plans
(including flight-tests); collecting reliability, availability, and
maintainability data; and maintaining a common engineering database.
[Ref. 66:p.l]
Combined testing was an innovative initiative intended to integrate
government and contractor efforts during the development phase. The
methodology was adopted to reduce redundancy in developmental testing
between government and contractor test communities, and thus reduce
much of the expense and time associated with its execution. The
objective was for both parties to jointly conduct a single test and share
the resultant data. [Ref. 59]
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c. The Environment Turns Threatening
In an effort to stave off OSD level budget reductions, BG
Mullen attempted to institute other streamlining initiatives as well. His
intent was to merge PDRR with aspects of EMD and thus lower costs and
accelerate aircraft production. His effort was only partially rewarded.
While a Process Action Team endeavored to find opportunities to
streamline the Comanche acquisition process, senior leadership in OSD
was considering eliminating the entire program. In October 1994,
Comanche won approval from Dr. Kaminski to implement streamlining
activities, but in December, DEPSECDEF Deutch issued his directive
relegating the program to a technology-based project. It seemed that for
every step the program took forward, it took two steps back.
Nevertheless, the reputation Comanche earned as a model acquisition
program while under BG Andreson, continued under BG Mullen. [Ref.
64:p.l] Despite unstable funding and commitment, the management of
Comanche continued to persevere.
3. Early Operational Capability Aircraft Strategy
When Colonel Snider took the helm of the Comanche program, he
faced a very threatening environment. The DEPSECDEF had just
relegated Comanche to a technology-base program, placing Comanche in
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a precarious position. If the program were required to reduce its
production effort and refocus only on technology development, Colonel
Snider knew it would be a prime candidate for cancellation during every
subsequent budget cycle. The decreasing budgets experienced by the
Army over the following years would certainly have put the Comanche at
risk.
The EOC program was conceived as a result of the environment
confronting Comanche. As Snider, Irby, Sullivan, and Decker met in
Seattle, Washington, they knew they had little time and limited
opportunities to devise a plan to save Comanche. Their belief in the
Army's armed reconnaissance requirement, and the Comanche's ability
to satisfy it, was at the core of their attempt to find a solution. The
consensus was that the program could sell itself, if senior OSD and Army
leadership could be made to see its potential. [Ref. 46] Unfortunately,
after 12 years and over a billion dollars, the program had little to show.
The group believed that a demonstration of the aircraft's abilities would
persuade senior leadership that their money had been well spent.
Prototype aircraft, originally an integral part of the baseline strategy,
might have allayed these concerns earlier; however, affordability
constraints led to their cancellation.
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Contrasting Comanche with a similar program illustrates the value
of developmental prototypes. The Air Force's next-generation fighter, the
F-22, began life only two years prior to the Comanche. [Ref. 33:p. 157]
As with the Army's advanced helicopter, the F-22 acquisition strategy
included the use of prototype aircraft to demonstrate advertised
performance qualities, and identify and reduce technical, cost, and
schedule risk. [Ref. 33 :p. 170] However, budget constraints quickly
eliminated this option from Comanche's strategy.
In 1988, OSD concern over affordability forced BG Andreson to
restructure his program in order to pass a second MS I review.
Constrained budgets forced the PM to cancel prototype construction. In
FY88, the Comanche program's annual appropriation included $70
million of a requested $267 million. [Ref. 51] In FY89, Comanche
received all of its requested $125 million to support the revised strategy.
[Ref. 67] In contrast, for FY88 and FY89, the F-22 received a combined
$1,192 billion of a requested $1,239 billion, and was preparing for the
development of four prototype aircraft. [Ref. 51] [Ref. 67] While
Comanche was receiving approximately 50% of its requested budget, the
F-22 was receiving 96% of its request.
By FY92, the F-22 prototypes had successfully flown a total of 157
hours, the program had entered EMD, and its annual budget had leaped
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to over $2 billion. [Ref. 33:p. 23] [Ref. 51] [Ref. 67] [Ref. 68] The
Comanche on the other hand, did not have any prototypes, was being
directed to restructure once again, and to indefinitely defer its production
plans.
As the Army program faced possible termination, it could only
point to small-scale risk-reduction efforts to demonstrate that the
program was progressing. In an interview, Major General Snider (PEO
Aviation) stated that one of the more difficult tasks he faced was keeping
OSD leadership interested in the program. As individuals rotated
through critical OSD positions, they often had little or no appreciation of
the program's history. The result was a constant struggle by the PMs to
maintain positive program visibility and relevancy. [Ref. 46] While the
more important aspect of prototyping may have been risk-reduction,
another benefit was a demonstration of program progression to those
individuals responsible for funding the program.
Success of the EOC plan rested on two factors: six reconnaissance-
capable aircraft had to be produced within the same constrained budget
as before; and the Army had to be convinced that this was a good idea.
Without flying prototypes to demonstrate the Comanche's value, the
program faced a daunting task. The answer came in the form of a tag-
team effort to sell the program, by the PM and Boeing Sikorsky.
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Few opportunities to promote the Comanche and the new
acquisition strategy were missed. The use of mockups and simulators to
advertise the futuristic appearance and capabilities of Comanche became
commonplace at every OSD activity. Tom Clancy was enlisted to use his
considerable popularity with DoD leadership and speak on behalf of the
program. For his part, he was so impressed with the system that he
assisted without payment or compensation. [Ref. 46]
Snider's gamble on the EOC plan achieved its initial goal of saving
the program from the budget axe. The public relations effort of both
Boeing Sikorsky and the PM managed to invigorate a floundering support
base and put the Comanche back on the Army's priority list.
4. Pre-Production Prototype Program
When BG Bergantz began his tour as PM in June 1997, the
program environment could not have been more different from that
facing his predecessor. While Colonel Snider was greeted with threats of
cancellation, General Bergantz inherited a program enjoying newfound
support. Congress had increased the FY97 budget by $49 million to
$338.6 million. [Ref. 69 :p. 10] The first prototype aircraft, after
overcoming some technical difficulties, was steadily expanding its flight
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envelope. [Ref. 26] General Bergantz, however, was uneasy with the
historically fragile underpinnings of Comanche support.
The EOC plan called for delivery of six reconnaissance-capable
aircraft by 2002. In essence, these aircraft would only be partially
mission capable, as they would lack the sophisticated target detection,
identification, and targeting systems planned for the final production
aircraft. Additionally, they would be completely unarmed. General
Bergantz's concern was that delivery of these aircraft might have the
opposite effect from what was originally intended. Instead of endearing
the aircraft to its users, he was concerned the aircraft might focus
attention on the tasks the EOC aircraft were not yet capable of
performing. [Ref. 59]
To avoid this perception, General Bergantz believed the program
strategy must undergo another restructure. This was a difficult decision,
based on the instability of past strategies. Nevertheless, his decision to
restructure the program significantly altered the near-term program
deliverables, and contained some risk.
Like his predecessor, BG Bergantz required the aviation
community's vote of confidence if he were to succeed at restructuring the
program. While appearing to promise greater numbers and better-
equipped aircraft, the PPP plan also delayed, once again, delivery of the
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Army's first Comanche. General Bergantz knew he must emphasize that
despite a slip in the schedule, the Army would now receive production-
configured aircraft, to include the new Longbow radar, (originally
scheduled for production with lot six) utilizing the existing EOC program
funding resources.
Two factors combined to make General Bergantz's gamble pay off.
The first was the favorable atmosphere surrounding the program. Since
the inception of the EOC program, the Comanche had enjoyed renewed
interest and support. The Army was touting the aircraft as the linchpin
of its future digital battlefield plans. [Ref. 70:p. 29] Congressional
leaders such as California Republican Representative Robert Dornan,
began speaking on behalf of the program. [Ref. 71:p. 9] The program
now had a prototype flying, and Boeing Sikorsky had instituted a
successful marketing campaign. Influential Congressional and OSD
leadership were brought to the West Palm Beach, Florida, flight test
center to observe the aircraft first hand, and fly alongside the Comanche
while it conducted actual test flights. Clearly, the prevailing atmosphere
was receptive to change.
General Bergantz had to convince more than just Congressional
and OSD leadership. The second key factor in Bergantz's gamble
involved swaying senior Army leaders, and in particular, Army Aviation
96
leadership, which had been waiting for Comanche since the originally
scheduled fielding date of 1996. To many, slipping the schedule another
year seemed like just another delay in a series of delays. To ensure
support, the PM emphasized the production quality of the aircraft, and
offered an additional 1400 flight hours for IOT&E. BG Bergantz' greatest
risk, however, was the integration of the Longbow radar into lot one
versus lot six. The radar had long been recognized as the highest risk
element in the program due to immature technology. However, it was of
tremendous benefit to the user, and to BG Bergantz, worth the gamble.
Finally, General Bergantz offered to purchase additional simulation and
training devices to be used for the development of TTP. [Ref. 59]
The EOC and PPP restructures were two of the most significant
factors in maintaining the viability of the Comanche program. While
each PM established their restructures under significantly different
environments, the results were equally important. Colonel Snider was
attempting to save the program from certain death by providing the Army
with something the original strategy would have provided if not for
budget constraints: Prototypes. General Bergantz was motivated by the
concern that a less than optimal aircraft would result in a loss of support
for the program. Most important to the success of both strategies was
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the ability for both PMs to achieve their considerable goals within the
same budget resources.
D. THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
As early as 1994, DoD and the Army in particular began to express
their concern over the shrinking helicopter industrial base. The far-
reaching effects of downsizing the military included numerous defense
industry mergers. In an August 1994, Government Executive article, the
Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for RDA,
Lieutenant General (LTG) William Forster, stated that current
procurement plans would leave a gap in helicopter production. "Given
that the commercial helicopter base is already much smaller than it was
a decade ago, that means that all our helicopter buys in the future will
be very expensive." [Ref. 56:p. 104] The following year, the only factory
producing a new aircraft was Sikorsky, with its UH-60 Black Hawk. The
bulk of government helicopter contracts were for modifications and
upgrades to existing aircraft. [Ref. 72 :p. 104]
In 1995, there were four major military helicopter manufacturers.
Despite that limited number, SECDEF William Perry was intensifying
pressure on the industry to consolidate into no more than two major
companies. Perry cited as the culprit for requiring industry
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consolidation, a minimum of two additional years of sharply-declining
budgets in FY96 and FY97. [Ref. 73:p. 29] By 1997, Boeing and
McDonnell Douglas would merge, leaving the industry with only three
companies [Ref. 61]
The Comanche represented the only new helicopter program in 25
years. [Ref. 70: p. 34] Its cancellation would leave both the Army and
Sikorsky in dangerous positions. Assuming a procurement cycle of just
half that of Comanche's, the Army would be well into the second decade
of the new millennium before it would begin seeing an answer to its
reconnaissance shortcomings.
According to Richard Aboulafia, an aviation industry analyst with
the Teal Group, an aerospace and defense consulting firm, Sikorsky
would be the biggest loser in the event Comanche were cancelled.
Boeing's V-22 Osprey program and AH-64D Longbow Apache
remanufacture program represent large, well-supported and fully-funded
programs. Funding for Sikorsky's UH-60 Black Hawk rebuild program is
not as certain, and faces continuing budget wrangling. [Ref. 74:p. 33]
Even to the casual observer, the impact of the defense downsizing
effort, coupled with shrinking defense budgets over the last 12 years, has
been dramatic. In particular, it illustrates the difficult position senior
OSD and Army officials find themselves in, when considering the fate of
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Comanche. Regardless of the actual or perceived performance and value
of the aircraft, the cost of cancellation has become too great. By failing
to both fully support and properly fund the program over the past 20
years, or make the hard decision to simply cancel it, the Army and OSD
have placed themselves in a position with little to no latitude. A decision
to not produce the aircraft after almost 20 years of effort and several
billions of dollars in RDT&E funds could result in the loss of yet another
member of the shrinking defense industry, but more importantly, would
leave the Army with a still unfulfilled armed reconnaissance requirement.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the significant elements of the
Comanche's long-term success. Three main points can be derived from a
study of the program's history. They include:
1 . Despite significant changes to the National Military Strategy,
neither the Army's requirement for a reconnaissance aircraft
nor support from the aviation community has changed.
Throughout the program's history, a host of cost and
alternative analyses and OSD-level reviews have confirmed
both the Army's requirement and its choice of aircraft.
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2. The Comanche's government and commercial program
management efforts have been critical in achieving minimal
deviations from planned schedules and costs, despite the
numerous changes the program has endured.
Management's ability to continually show improvement while
adapting to changes has maintained a positive reflection on
the program.
3. As the DoD downsized over the last decade, the helicopter
industry has suffered the effects of the resultant smaller
budgets. The result is a very fragile defense helicopter
industry, and an Army that has put off other helicopter
developmental programs for the past 20 years. The
consequence of cancellation would include an even longer
delay in satisfying the aerial reconnaissance requirement
and, quite possibly, the loss of yet another military helicopter
manufacturer.
The next chapter will conclude by addressing each of the thesis
research questions. Additionally, it will discuss areas for further
research.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this research effort was to document the past
eighteen years of the RAH-66 Comanche's program history. The goal was
to identify the significant issues, events, and actions taken by Program
Managers, the Army, and other Government agencies that allowed the




The need to understand and appreciate the history of the
Comanche program and the significant events and decisions associated
with its management, are critical for government officials involved in the
planning, budgeting, and reporting of DoD programs. Assuming defense
budgets continue to shrink, as they have throughout the Comanche's
history, competition among and within the services for the limited
available funds will be fierce. In fact, many programs will likely
experience circumstances very much like the Comanche's. In that event,
an understanding of how the Comanche PMs managed the program given
103
the numerous challenges they faced would be beneficial for other
acquisition officials.
This research concluded that the viability of Comanche could be
attributed to several factors. They include stable requirements,
proficient management, and a perceived need to protect the shrinking
defense helicopter industry. While the latter is clearly not under the
control of a PM, he or she can, either directly or indirectly, influence the
former. In the case of Comanche, each of the PMs struggled with a lack
of overall commitment and budget consistency. That battle required the
adoption and creation of innovative management techniques that, in the
end, has maintained the viability of the program for 18 years.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations in two areas are indicated by this thesis effort.
The first has to do with policies and processes for approving the
development of new weapon systems. The Comanche program illustrates
what can happen when Congress, OSD, or the Service leadership fails to
fully support a program despite a valid need, or to make the equally
difficult decision of cancellation. Services must be required to
adequately justify the importance of not only the mission need and
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operational requirement of a system, but also to demonstrate the means
and the commitment to support it through production.
The second has to do with the innovative measures employed by
Comanche PMs. The effect of these innovations on the viability of
Comanche illustrates the importance of maintaining the capability and
flexibility to tailor an acquisition program to meet a changing and
challenging environment, and these should be reflected in acquisition
management policies and procedures. These measures could be applied
to any military acquisition to improve the ultimate result: Delivery of a
product the user wanted and expected, on time and on budget.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Subsidiary Question #1. What is the history of the RAH-66
Comanche Helicopter Acquisition Program?
Chapter IV illustrates the history of the RAH-66 Comanche
program, one that can be best characterized as turbulent and
unpredictable. After 18 years, the program has endured a number of
restructures, principally caused by budget inconsistency and perceived
technological immaturity. The result is a program that according to the
original acquisition strategy should be well into production, but instead
is only now approaching its MS II review.
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The history of the program is also replete with examples of
innovation and excellence in management. From its earliest days under
the management of BG Andreson, the program strived to achieve a level
of performance that would reflect efficiency as well as progress, all
executed in an uncertain and often unfriendly environment. This
research indicates that each PM, through the implementation of
resourceful management techniques such as the EOC plan, has been
responsible for sustaining the program under such conditions.
Subsidiary Question #2. What was the Army's initial acquisition
strategy for the Comanche program and how has it evolved?
The original baseline acquisition strategy approved on August 12,
1984, for the then LHX, established an IOC date of FY92. Through the
use of a combined MS 1/ II review, it planned to undergo only the CE,
EMD and Production acquisition phases. The strategy called for
competitive development of flying prototypes through EMD, culminating
with an air vehicle fly-off, with the winner entering production shortly
thereafter. Total RDT&E budget was estimated at $3.2 billion.
As the program prepares to undergo its MS II review, it bears little
resemblance to the baseline strategy of 18-years ago. The combined MS
I / II review was terminated during the first formal restructure, in favor of
a discrete PDRR phase. The use of competitive flying prototypes was
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cancelled early on due to budget constraints. Down-select to a single
contracting team was initiated soon after entering PDRR. The current
strategy calls for an MS II decision in April 2000. EMD will include the
manufacture of 14 production-quality aircraft for use in developmental
testing and IOT&E. Total RDT&E budget now exceeds $8 billion dollars.
Subsidiary Question #3. What innovative measures were taken by
the Program Managers in the development of the aircraft?
The Comanche program exemplified several innovative program
management initiatives. Of particular interest was the use of the Design
Flexibility Clause in the program's contract development. This clause
allowed the contractor to perform necessary tradeoffs in order to achieve
program goals, without enduring time-consuming and expensive contract
modifications. Another innovative measure was the Combined Test Team
(CTT). The CTT included members from the prime and sub-contractors,
as well as from the program office. CTT members shared in executing
test plans (including flight-tests); collecting reliability, availability, and
maintainability data; and maintaining a common engineering database.
Two other significant measures instituted by the PMs must be
mentioned, the EOC plan and the PPP plan. While occurring under
different circumstances, their respective impacts on the program were
considerable. The EOC plan was conceived under the imminent threat of
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program termination. The foundation of the plan, providing the user
with reconnaissance capable aircraft, was, in the researcher's opinion,
what saved the program from termination and established a new
program environment. The PPP plan then seized the opportunity for
constructive strategy change, presented by favorable program sentiment
among DoD acquisition officials, by reestablishing the former program
strategy of providing production-quality aircraft to the user.
Subsidiary Question #4. What lessons can be learned from
studying the history and development of the RAH-66 Comanche
Helicopter program?
The primary lesson to be learned from a historical analysis of the
Comanche program is the realization that a lack of commitment by
Congress and senior OSD and Army leadership can quickly kill the
momentum of a program that may eventually lead to its cancellation. As
with any large commercial organization, if management commits itself to
a product but does not adequately resource its development, its
expectations will never be fulfilled.
Conversely, indiscriminate funding of a program does not insure
success either. The F-22 for example, has been amply funded
throughout its developmental cycle, reached EMD very early on, and is
now threatened with cancellation due to perceived technological
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immaturity. [Ref. 75] [Ref. 76] The Comanche's protracted development
has resulted in a much more mature aircraft than what might be
expected in a shorter developmental cycle. If the program receives
approval to continue into EMD, it should ultimately result in significantly
reduced risk.
The Comanche is a history of wavering OSD and even Army
support, which translated into inconsistent budgets that resulted in a
significantly delayed schedule and drastically increased costs. This
program was not an example of poor program management, cost
overruns, or inadequate weapon system design. The original armed
reconnaissance requirement and the choice of the current Comanche
helicopter to fulfill that requirement, has been verified and validated
several times. Rather, this program is an example of what can occur to a
good idea and a good solution, when senior leadership fails to fully
support their own decisions.
Primary Research Question. What significant events and issues
have occurred over the course of the RAH-66 Comanche program that
have allowed it to remain a viable program?
The previous chapter illustrated three reasons that stand out as
significant contributors to the viability of the Comanche program. Each
plays a key role in understanding the forces at work behind Comanche.
First, while events in the world have changed the threat facing the Army,
its requirement for accurate and timely intelligence, which Comanche is
designed to provide, has remained unchanged. This requirement, and
the subsequent choice of the current design to fulfill the requirement,
has been continually evaluated by TRADOC and independent analysis
throughout the history of the program and deemed relevant and
appropriate.
Secondly, although both cost and schedule have become an issue
with the program, it has been innovative, proactive program management
by both government and contractors, which is responsible for keeping
the program on track. Management's ability to continually show
improvement while adapting to significant changes, has maintained a
positive reflection on the program.
Finally, without any new military helicopters under development,
the Comanche represents the only new development in a dwindling U. S.
helicopter industrial base. Its cancellation would leave industry only
DoD aircraft modification and production contracts.
E. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis was a historical analysis of a program that has endured
the full spectrum of change occurring in DoD over the last two decades.
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Other major programs have also had to face the same changes. A
comparative analysis of two programs could be conducted to determine
the impact of the military downsizing on each program and how the
particular PMs or services reacted to those changes.
The research identified the importance of the involvement of the
using community throughout the developmental lifecycle of a program. A
historical study of user organizations, such as the Army's TRADOC
System Manager, in the development of past weapon systems might
illustrate effective management practices to emulate on future programs.
The Combined Test Team was an innovative management tool used
by the program to combine the efforts of several organizations. The
intent of the CTT was to share information between the testing
community and the contractor, and reduce overall costs. A detailed
analysis of this approach and its cumulative effect on the Comanche
program from both a program perspective as well as from the test
community's perspective might provide useful information for other
programs.
Recent studies at the Naval Postgraduate School have, through the
use of surveys, developed lists of program management competencies
deemed most critical for PMs to possess, in order to be successful in the
DoD acquisition environment. The four Program Managers of the
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Comanche program discussed in this thesis each governed the program
through challenging times. However, each individual was also
confronted with different environments in which to manage. BG
Andreson, for example, executed his duties during the height of the
Reagan buildup, while Colonel Snider managed the program during the
lowest defense budgets in recent history. A comparative analysis of the
Comanche PMs could be conducted to determine what competencies
were most important to PMs who managed the same program but under
different environments. This research would provide examples to future
managers as well as credibility to the current list of the competencies.
History has much to teach those that would learn from it. In
terms of acquisition, the historical case analysis provides a means to
assess the processes, decisions, and outcomes of program management
techniques. Further historical analysis of any number of programs
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